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This paper seeks to explore the sources of substantive divergence between the antitrust 
regimes of the U.S. and EC and to present a framework upon which harmonization could 
potentially be achieved. While the rise of the Chicago School and post-Chicago theory 
have merged to ensure a central role for economics in dictating antitrust enforcement in 
the United States, no such clear standard has emerged in Europe. The consequences for 
firms operating on a transatlantic basis are potentially severe, as they have to formulate 
different business strategies depending on which jurisdiction they operate in. An 
assessment of EC law demonstrates an interesting amalgam of conflicting jurisprudential 
bases, including the overriding goal of achieving single market integration, the pervasive, 
though subtle, presence of ordoliberal thought and a qualified desire to protect small 
competitors from more efficient rivals. It will be argued that the transatlantic schism 
currently witnessed is not inevitable and that the unique roles played by competition 
policy in the EC do not prohibit the employment of price theoretic principles. 
This paper will seek to articulate a basis for the asymmetry in treatment given certain 
business practices by the U.S. and EC. Doing so will enable businesses to more readily 
understand the construction given corporate behavior by European authorities and to 
adopt their strategies accordingly. Moreover, a framework will be advanced that is 
facilitative of modern economic theory and which would, if universally employed, 
bring Europe not only to harmonization with the United States but to the end  toward 
which it is already gravitating.
3Exploring the Source of Transatlantic Antitrust Divergence
• Introduction
Competition law, as a distinct discipline, has been subject to a fascinating and turbulent 
history.1 Inextricably linked to such fields as economics, politics and sociology, vigorous 
debate has ensued as to the proper manner in which to employ the potent provisions 
antitrust has at its disposal.2 Such divisive discourse has ultimately failed to produce a 
clear standard enjoying the support of a plain majority of the world’s commentators. The 
result has been a plethora of arguably flawed case law, flowing from a ubiquitous judicial 
failure to derive and articulate a consistent and sound body of principles from the 
internally inconsistent, and often diametrically opposed, academic literature.3 Much of 
the ensuing jurisprudence can be characterized by the adoption of economically illiterate 
principles, due to courts’ intuition in a field where the economic effect of various 
business practices may be strongly counter-intuitive.4
1 See generally RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, 
LAW. (Oxford University Press 2000); DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH 
CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (Oxford University Press 2001).
2 Compare, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (University of Chicago Press 2d ed. 2001),
with Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979), with
Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257 
(2001).
3 See generally ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH  ITSELF (2d 
ed. 1993) (discussing how the numerous political and socioeconomic ends toward which 
competition policy have been historically applied ultimately resulted in a confused body of law, 
full of inherently contradictory legal provisions.)
4 Tim Brennan, Do advances in economic theory lead to advances in legal practice? The Legacy 
of U.S. v. Microsoft, (2003) at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv26n4/v26n4-3.pdf (“In 
the… “pre-Chicago,” era, which lasted until the 1970s, economics took a back seat to 
impressionistic assessments of harm.”)
4Such unconsidered, and oftentimes intellectually erroneous, judicial interpretation 
provided the backdrop to the rise of the Chicago School in the 1980s – a body of thought 
dedicated to the employment of microeconomic theory as the tool by which to formulate 
competition rules for the sole benefit of consumers.5 Chicago has been met with opposing 
degrees of warmth on opposite sides of the Atlantic.6 The gulf has been further 
exacerbated by the rise of post-Chicago theory, calling for the combination of dynamic 
game theory with empiricism.7 Meanwhile, Europe remains concerned with numerous 
issues that do not trouble U.S. antitrust enforcers. Particularly prevalent amongst these is 
the overriding goal of furthering single market integration through the employment of 
competition law.8 Moreover, and as will be explored in detail below, a highly distinctive 
school of socio-economic thought, known as ordoliberalism, continues to pervade the law 
of the European Union.
As a result of the foregoing, the aspiration of achieving ubiquitous cooperation and 
uniformity through international antitrust harmonization faces a difficult, and what is 
perhaps a unique, challenge within the broader realm of international legal 
synchronization more generally.9 Strong divergence in opinion continues to arise as to 
how to best apply antitrust principles, or, perhaps more accurately, for whose benefit 
those principles ought to be applied.
5 Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925 (1979).
6 See, e.g., Thomas J. Horton & Dr. Stefan Schmitz, A Tale of Two Continents: The Coming 
Clash of the Conflicting Economic Viewpoints in Europe and the United States, at
http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/205.htm.
7 See generally, Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 2.
8 See, e.g., RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW (Butterworths 4th ed. 2003) at 18 – 20.
9 See, e.g., Pitofsky, Competition Policy in a Global Economy – Today and Tomorrow, (Nov. 4, 
1998), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/global.htm.
5In surveying the field as a whole, two particularly forceful insights have struck the 
author: (1) international synchronization in the context of such asymmetric theoretical 
underpinnings between and within jurisdictions poses a singular challenge, and (2) 
resolution of the inconsistencies underlying different jurisdictions’ competition policies 
requires the identification, and ultimate acceptance, of a single foundational standard.
The focus of the following study shall, therefore, be on the extent and source of 
divergence between the two most important jurisdictions within the sphere of antitrust, 
namely the European Community and the United States. While there has been quite 
ostensible success to date in international antitrust cooperation between these two 
jurisdictions,10 it is clear that quite succinct distinctions exist and have been brought to 
the limelight in dramatic fashion in recent years. Foremost amongst these in terms of 
substantive divergence is the failed GE/Honeywell merger, which was vetoed in Europe, 
after having been approved in America.11 It certainly seems that international 
10 See, e.g., Pamela Jones Harbour, Remarks before NYSBA International Law and Practice 
Section, Developments in Competition Law in the European Union and the United States: 
Harmony and Conflict, (Oct. 21, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/051021competitionlaw.pdf) (“From my perspective… there 
is far more harmony than conflict among US and EU competition enforcers. Furthermore, while 
we cannot rule out future conflicts, I believe that the trend is towards more convergence and 
harmony.”); Margaret Bloom, The U.S. and EU  Move Towards Substantial Antitrust 
Convergence on Consumer Welfare Based Enforcement, ANTITRUST, Vol. 19, No. 3 18, 22 
(Summer 2005). See also Randolph W. Tritell, International Antitrust Convergence: A Positive 
View, (Summer 2005) at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/tritellpostiveview.pdf; 
Remarks of Chairman Robert Pitofsky, EU and U.S. Approaches to International Mergers -
Views from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, before European Commission Merger Control 
10th Anniversary Conference, The European Commission Directorate General for Competition, 
International Bar Association, Metropole Hotel, Brussels, Belgium, (14-15 Sept. 2000), at
www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf
11 Compare U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, Justice Department Requires Divestitures 
General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001), at 
6harmonization has yet to achieve unqualified success and that the source of this 
shortcoming lies in the answer to one, misleadingly simple, question: to what ultimate 
end should competition law be applied?12
• The Transatlantic Divide
An economic approach to competition policy, which aims to promote consumer welfare 
by minimizing deadweight loss through the maximization of industrial output, today 
plays an increasingly important role in the function and application of competition law in 
the European Community.13 In particular, there is evidence that an economic approach to 
antitrust policy is becoming more widely accepted.14 Yet, in contrast to the United States, 
such an approach has yet to emerge as the primary and exclusively correct manner in 
which to apply competition law.15 Even a cursory examination of the case law reveals a 
strong desire on the part of European authorities to apply competition law with fairness in 
mind – a position abandoned in the U.S. following the Warren Court’s era.16
Concordantly, European competition policy is best described, at present, as constituting 
an amalgam of various philosophic, political and economic policies and ideals. The result 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8140.htm, with General 
Electric/COMP/M.2220, EC Decision of July 3, 2001, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf.
12
 Charles A. James, International Antitrust in the 21st Century: Cooperation and Convergence, 
(Oct. 17, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9330.pdf.
13 See, e.g., William J. Kolasky, U.S. and EU competition policy: Cartels, Mergers, and Beyond, 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9848.pdf.
14 See, e.g., RICHARD WHISH, supra note 8.
15
 See, e.g., Alasdair Murray, deputy director of the Centre for European Reform, Consumers and 
EU Competition Policy, (Sept. 2005), at http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_consumers.pdf.
16 See, e.g., David J. Gerber, Fairness in Competition Law: European and U.S. Experience, at
http://www.kyotogakuen.ac.jp/~o_ied/information/fairness_in_competition_law.pdf (Mar. 5, 
2004).
7is a body of law with somewhat conflicting objectives and principles which combine to 
create a significant challenge for international antitrust harmonization.
It is this distinction in philosophical outlook that has led to, what at times have been, 
quite major departures from the goal of achieving horizontal uniformity.17
Some of the criticism emanating from the United States has denounced the European 
Community for simply employing competition policy in a manner designed to benefit 
competitors, as opposed to consumers.18 “U.S. law protects consumers, not competitors” 
has been the cry.19 The axiomatic inference is that EC law has been, or is, applied without 
primary importance being placed on the consumer and that European competition law is, 
perhaps, biased in its application. Nepotism toward both “state champions” and small 
companies is a typical complaint.20
Nevertheless, this paper will attempt to articulate a more perspicacious view to the effect 
that criticisms of the above nature may be fallacious, specious and ultimately obtuse 
insofar as they omit consideration of a most fundamental possibility – that perhaps EC 
17 Charles A. James, supra note 12 (concluding that the EC/U.S. rift with respect to 
GE/Honeywell can only be explained by a diametrically opposed fundamental view as to the role 
of competition law, rather than by any lack of cooperation.)
18 See Department of Justice Press Release, Statement by Assistant Attorney General
Charles A. James on the EU’s Decision Regarding the GE/Honeywell Acquisition ( July
3, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press releases/2001/8510.htm.
19
 John R. Wilke, U.S. Antitrust Chief Criticizes EU Decision to Reject Merger of GE and 
Honeywell, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2001, at A3 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Charles James: 
“Clear and longstanding U.S. antitrust policy holds that the antitrust laws protect competition, not 
competitors… [the European Commission’s decision] reflects a significant point of divergence.”)
20 See. e.g., Hal R. Varian, Economic Scene; In Europe, GE and Honeywell ran afoul of 19th-
century thinking, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2001.
8competition law is indeed attempting to promote consumer welfare, though in a manner 
distinctive from, and occasionally diametrically opposed to, the path taken in the United 
States.21 This omission may be fatal within the context of international harmonization, for 
an effective sine qua non for the successful attainment thereof is that all jurisdictions 
understand the fundamental goals of each other’s systems. Progressive attempts to 
synchronize laws will undoubtedly encounter many obstacles if both sides do not enjoy 
full knowledge of the other’s starting point.22
In this regard, it is most certainly not helpful when commentators on one side condemn a 
body of the law without understanding the source of the divergence in question. Such 
simplistic criticism serves only to engrain a fundamental view, in this case with respect to 
how best to promote consumer welfare, which is perhaps anachronistic. Interestingly, nor 
is it helpful when European officials proclaim an approach to consumer welfare 
analogous to that followed in the United States if such an analogy is, in fact, 
inappropriate. In other words, there is reason to believe that recent statements by high-
ranking European officials may be somewhat nugatory, as they are not made in the 
context of a concomitant aspiration to narrow the prevailing wisdom in Europe regarding 
the role of consumer welfare so as to more closely match the jurisprudence in the United 
States.23 It is submitted that such recent, pro-claimed statements are more strongly 
21 See, e.g., Thomas J. Horton & Dr. Stefan Schmitz, supra note 6.
22
 Charles A. James, supra note 12 (“Cooperation alone will not resolve some significant areas of 
difference among antitrust regimes that must be addressed if we are to maintain the integrity of 
antitrust on a global stage.”)
23 See, e.g., Neelie Kroes, European Competition Policy – Delivering Better Markets and Better 
Choices, (15 Sept. 2005), at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/512&format=HTML&
9indicative of a fear of being criticized abroad than they are of a fundamental shift in 
policy. Take, for instance, the recent comments of the European Competition
Commissioner, Neelie Kroes:
“I am aware that it is often suggested that – unlike Section 2 of the Sherman Act –
Article 82 is intrinsically concerned with “fairness” and therefore not focused
primarily on consumer welfare…
My own philosophy on this is fairly simple. First, it is competition, and not
competitors, that is to be protected. Second, ultimately the aim is to avoid
consumers harm.”24
At first glance, this is tremendously encouraging and could be construed as a 
commitment on the part of the head of the European competition authority to actively 
shape European antitrust law into a body of principles more akin to those in the United 
States, by adopting the principal tenet of the Chicago School – protecting consumers, but 
not competitors. However, given the history of EC competition law, there is reason to be 
skeptical. In addition, and in the context of the above comments, Neelie Kroes 
emphasized that: “it is not our intention to propose a radical shift in enforcement 
policy.”25
Nevertheless, insofar as these remarks evidence some desire within the Commission to 
apply European competition rules in a manner more firmly guided by the economics of 
industrial organization, there is reason to take heart.
aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (“Consumer welfare is now well established as the 
standard the Commission applies when assessing mergers and infringements of the Treaty rules.”)





In contrast to some of the simplistic criticism of the European approach, this paper shall 
attempt to demonstrate that the divergence in policy between the two jurisdictions rests
on something quite subtle and reflects, in part, Europe’s continuing adherence to the 
basic tenets of the Freiburg School, the details of which shall be discussed momentarily. 
It shall be argued that the European authorities have indeed attempted to employ 
competition law to maximize consumer welfare, but that such attempts have occasionally 
been guided by a theory in direct contradiction to the basic teaching of the Chicago 
School. A natural, and highly important, off-shoot of this insight will relate to the relative 
wisdom of employing these conflicting ideologies, particularly with respect to the new 
economy.
This last question will bring us full circle and to the ultimate conclusion that, although 
perhaps suffering from myopia in failing to realize that protection of competitors from 
one another is not the goal of EC competition law, but rather a consequence of the 
manner in which it seeks to promote consumer welfare, the criticism emanating from the 
United States may nonetheless be justified insofar as it demonstrates that the European 
definition of consumer welfare is no longer – if it ever was – appropriate in light of 
modern economic theory. 
Therefore, the first step, after extrapolating the foundational features of the Chicago and 
Freiburg Schools, will be to make a definitive inquiry as to the relative advantages of the 
two schools – broadly defined –  and to make an argument for the adoption of an optimal 
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route. This exercise will provide two benchmarks for those seeking international 
harmonization, namely the identification of the source of divergence, as well as the best 
route away from this point. In this regard, price theory will be demonstrated to be the 
key. It will be argued that the EC’s expansionist definition of consumer welfare is no 
longer appropriate, particularly with respect to the emergence of the new economy.26
Having concluded that consumer welfare, defined in the economic sense, ought to be the 
sole guide in employing competition law, the second step will be to examine the 
preceding theory and conclusions within the context of particular aspects of antitrust 
jurisprudence. In this regard, it is submitted that the roots of divergence can be most 
accurately delineated, and the optimum approach identified, when ascertained from the 
perspective of a select number of confined areas of competition law. The same route 
could conceivably be undertaken within the realm of any number of alternative business 
practices and the legal reactions to them, but predatory pricing, refusals to supply and 
product tying provide the ideal test cases.
It is the ultimate contention of this paper that the fundamental distinction between the EC 
and U.S. competition regimes relates not to whether the protection and promotion of 
consumer welfare should be the ultimate aspiration of antitrust policy, but on opposing 
views on how best to meet this goal. In other words, there is evidence that the difference 
between the two regimes is not as to what end to employ antitrust law, but as to how best 
26 This conclusion is by no means inescapable. Cf. Thomas J. Horton & Dr. Stefan Schmitz, supra 
note 6 (concluding that the DoJ and FTC will have to “become more responsive to the new wave 
of economic liberalism in future antitrust enforcement efforts” by making a move toward the 
European model of promoting consumer welfare “or risk losing their historical positions as the 
leaders of worldwide antitrust enforcement efforts.”)
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to get there. This is an encouraging insight and one that is obscured by the kind of 
uncritical criticism that has been leveled upon the EC by various U.S. commentators. It is 
encouraging because, each having recognized that the other desires the same outcome, it 
is merely a matter of debate and academic discourse as to whose approach, or whether an 
amalgam of both approaches, should emerge as the sole standard by which to employ the 
principles of competition law.
Yet, at a pragmatic level, it is undeniable that significant difficulty lies ahead in 
harmonizing the laws of the respective jurisdictions. This difficulty emanates from the 
fact that the ultimate divergence is with respect to political policy and any major 
alteration in course will require a fundamental shift in political thinking. Nevertheless, 
achieving the goal of harmonization need not be quixotic and it is hoped that the 
following academic study will be ultimately reflective of a larger, self-critical drive 
toward achieving harmonization. 
• The Pertinent Schools of Jurisprudence
This Section begins by looking to the foundations of U.S. antitrust law, with particular 
emphasis being placed on the rise of the Chicago School and the subsequent, widespread 
acceptance of its teachings, qualified only by the corrections of post-Chicago economics. 
The discussion relating to the above will, by design, be compendious, given the vast 
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literature already available on the subject and the ubiquitous understanding of the modern 
development of U.S. antitrust policy. Moreover, the focus will not be historical for a 
definite standard has emerged as dominant and has been applied in a largely unqualified 
manner.27 Thus, given this paper’s focus on harmonization, there seems little reason to 
recount defunct, historical details of American antitrust which have been largely 
discredited by the modern law. Instead, an accurate overview of the approach taken in 
America will suffice.
In contrast, the historical context to European law, and the various jurisprudential 
foundations which underlie it, continue to have a significant impact on the substantive 
law. Thus, far more attention will be paid to the sources and evolution of EC competition 
law, for, in addition to their continuing relevance, the significance of these facts have 
often escaped academic criticism and yet play a role of the most fundamental importance 
in explaining the divergence between EC and U.S. antitrust law. 
• The Chicago School
It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the Chicago School of economic thought on 
the development of competition policy over the past thirty years. This paper will not seek 
to recount the intricacies of the school in detail, for they are already well understood.28
However, a compendious discussion of the fundamental tenets of the school and the 
27
 Certain aspects of U.S. antitrust policy– including product tying – remain inconsistent with 
Chicago and post-Chicago economics, but these are part of a clear minority.
28 See generally Richard A. Posner, supra note 5.
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influence it has had on antitrust law provide the necessary foundation from which to 
consider the nature and direction of competition policy on both sides of the Atlantic. 
In order to understand the Chicago School approach to antitrust, one must appreciate the 
economic objections to monopoly, for it is against such evils that Chicagoans seek to 
employ competition law.
• Objections to monopoly
The basic objection to monopoly results from the profit-maximizing strategy pursued by 
an undertaking which is unconstrained by competition, both actual and potential. In 
maximizing profits, a monopolist will produce at the point where the marginal cost of 
producing another unit of output equals the marginal revenue which would be gained by 
selling that unit.29 As a monopolist faces a downward-sloping demand curve, the price it 
charges for a given unit will necessarily be larger than the marginal cost of producing that 
unit.30 As a result, the monopolist earns positive economic profits. 
Why the objection? There are two fundamental reasons. First, by charging a price above 
marginal cost, a deadweight loss is created for society in the form of foregone 
transactions that would have taken place but for the supracompetitive pricing.31
Essentially, there are consumers who value the product or service at a level at or beyond 
29 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, at 91.
30 Id. at 89.
31 See, e.g., JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS, 2d Ed at 357 – 361; WALDMAN & JENSEN, 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2d Ed at 42 – 44.
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the marginal cost to society of producing it, but who are nevertheless denied access to it. 
As a result, there is a loss in value as some consumers satisfy their demand by switching 
to goods that require more of society’s scarce resources to produce.32 In this sense, 
perverse incentives are created: a consumer believes he is acquiring an equivalent 
product, but in fact is purchasing a product that costs society more to produce.33 This is 
the necessary consequence of a restriction in industry-wide output and hence, in many 
analyses of allegedly anticompetitive practices, a competition authority or court will look 
to empirical and theoretical evidence of whether or not the challenged practices are 
output-enhancing or output-restricting. The answer to this question will necessarily 
provide an insight into whether deadweight loss is decreasing or increasing. 
The second objection to above-marginal cost pricing is that it creates perverse incentives 
on the part of a would-be monopolist to expend resources on acquiring and maintaining a 
monopolistic position. At the limit, such an undertaking would be willing to spend a sum 
equal to the discounted present value of its expected monopoly profits on obtaining that
position.34 This behavior is known as rent-seeking and such expenditure constitutes social 
waste.35
A further concern, which is often articulated, is known as x-inefficiency. X-inefficiency 
refers to the idea that a monopolist, which does not have to remain competitive against 
rivals to stay in business, has less incentive than a competitive firm to be efficient by 
32 See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 6th Ed at 278.
33 See RICHARD POSNER, supra note 2.
34 Id.
35 See, generally, POSNER, supra note 32, at 279 – 280.
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minimizing its costs.36 Whereas the first two concerns outlined above are acknowledged 
as genuine by most economic commentators, the concept of x –inefficiency is somewhat 
more controversial.37 Specifically, many feel that the underlying tenets of the concept are 
contradictory: insofar as it is assumed that a rational firm is a profit-maximizer, the 
assumption that a monopolist declines to maximize profits by failing to minimize costs in 
inconsistent with the underlying assumption.38 Nevertheless, the concern is sufficiently 
well-known as to justify its inclusion, albeit accompanied with a qualification.
• The Arguments of the Chicago School
The Chicago approach to antitrust policy is aimed solely at avoiding the various evils 
associated with monopoly identified above. Therefore, the twin aims of maximizing 
consumer welfare and allocative efficiency emerge as the combined source of 
competition policy. To achieve these aims, Chicagoans look to price theory as the means 
by which to inform the construction of efficiency- and wealth-maximizing rules.
The result of such an application of price theory was a surprising discovery – virtually all 
business practices condemned by the law, particularly unilateral actions, were benign 
when construed economically. Aaron Director and others at the University of Chicago 
quickly discovered that the explanations put forward by the courts for business conduct 
36 Id. at 281.
37 See, generally, RICHARD POSNER, supra note 2 at 18.
38 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 29, at 94 (“Monopolies want to maximize profits, and 
the only way a firm can do so is to minimize its costs at its chosen output level.”)
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believed to be objectionable could not withstand economic and logical scrutiny.39 Only 
horizontal price fixing and horizontal mergers of considerable size were regarded by the 
Chicago School as being worthy of condemnation.40
Diametrically opposed to the Chicago approach is the protection of inefficient 
competitors against their more efficient, generally larger, rivals. Such protection serves 
only to frustrate the attainment of efficiencies and to perpetuate the existence of 
inefficient business whose presence in the market is socially wasteful. Chicagoans 
therefore prescribe a Darwinian approach to competition policy and a concomitant faith 
in the ability of natural market forces to ensure efficient outcomes more readily than can 
judicial intervention.
The message that the competitive process is best furthered by refusing both to protect 
competitors and to prevent their exclusion from markets as a result of competitor action 
may seem, at first glance, somewhat paradoxical. But the paradox is resolved by FTC 
Chairman Deborah Platt Majors, who recently explained:
“I often am asked, particularly in Europe, “how it is that we can have competition 
without competitors?” 
Good question. We support competition because it will lead to efficiencies. But 
competition can be fierce and someone may “lose.” We do not seek to prop up the 
“loser” just to keep it in the game. And we do not seek to tame the competition, 
39 See, e.g., Aaron Director & Edward Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, N.W. U. L. 
REV. 281 (1956).
40 See generally Bork, supra note 3, at 221 (“mergers of up to 60 or 70 percent of the market 
should be permitted.”)
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through anticompetitive regulation or enforcement, to assist a rent-seeking 
rival.”41
The Chicago School has been immensely influential under U.S. law, particularly during 
the 1980s, and although its extreme conclusions calling for general per se legality have 
been undermined by “post-Chicago” advances,42 it seems clear that Chicago’s lasting 
effect will involve economics being viewed as the appropriate source of U.S. competition 
law. 
As is widely observed, and as will become readily apparent, the Chicago School has not 
enjoyed the level of acceptance in Europe that it has commanded across the Atlantic.43
This is presumably due to the fact that the Chicago approach is undeniably harsh in 
application and notions of general equity, in addition to the socioeconomic policies to be 
discussed shortly, likely constrain European policy setters. The process of competition by 
which consumers benefit is unforgiving and “punishes the unfortunate as well as the 
inefficient.”44
Nevertheless, the manner in which inefficient competitors give way to their superior 
rivals is a simple manifestation of Darwinian theory in action and allowing unfettered 
competition has overriding advantages. It falls to economists to counter highly influential 
stakeholders by advocating the superior, though not immediately apparent, benefits of 
allowing competition to thrive unhindered. Justice Easterbrook writes most succinctly:
41
 Remarks by Federal Trade Commission Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras on “U.S. antitrust 
practice -- how does it affect European Business?” (Apr. 7, 2005), at http:/www.useu.be
42 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 2.
43 See, e.g., Thomas J. Horton & Dr. Stefan Schmitz, supra note 6.
44 ROBERT BORK, supra note 3.
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“[A] producer's loss is no concern of the antitrust laws, which protect consumers 
from suppliers rather than suppliers from each other. If [the practice in question] 
should be called unfair competition, it is nonetheless competition. Competition is 
ruthless, unprincipled, uncharitable, unforgiving-and a boon to society, Adam 
Smith reminds us, precisely because of these qualities that make it a bane to other 
producers… the plaintiff's complaint is too much competition (injuring producers) 
rather than too little (injuring consumers). Entertaining claims of excessive 
competition would undermine the functions of the antitrust laws.”45
Adherence to these Darwinian principles has been far from unqualified in Europe. This is 
so for a number of reasons, the most obvious of which relates to equity, by which 
competitors are protected against the unfair actions of their more powerful rivals. More 
subtly, however, a number of unique jurisprudential foundations underlie EC competition 
law which bear significant explanatory power.
The following pages trace the highly important philosophical foundations of EC 
competition policy so as to explain Europe’s general hostility to an unqualified 
application of Chicago principles.
• The Protection of Politically Influential Businesses
Antitrust law, by the very nature of the subject matter it seeks to regulate, raises sensitive 
political issues. Foremost amongst these is the affinity many people have for family-run, 
small business, regarding it both as a source of livelihood for the fine people who run 
45 See, e.g., Stamatakis Industries, Inc. v. King, 965 F.2d 469, 471 (1992).
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them and as a good within society, providing a more human counter to, what is perhaps 
perceived to be, the increasingly impersonal nature of large corporations. Politically 
charged situations often arise when the entry of a large corporation into a neighborhood 
or larger market traditionally served by family-owned business results in the 
displacement of the latter by the former. Strong sympathies arise in the eyes of the public 
for the plight of the small business-owner trying to provide a living for his family. Such 
sympathies are, of course, both valid and understandable. Being a function of the political 
process, it is hardly surprising when antitrust law begins to incorporate such political 
sympathies in its jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, the Chicago School has condemned the employment of competition law for 
these purposes, referring to the kind of political empathy that motivates it as 
“uncritical.”46 While the loss caused by the arrival of large, efficient corporations is 
evident for all to see in the form of the displaced incumbent, the many losses arising from 
the prevention of such displacement are more subtle and no competition regime can claim 
to act responsibly if the gains of allowing free entry and competition are not weighed 
against the losses. This is why dogmatic and simplistic reaction to political sympathies, 
without factoring in the concomitant benefits, could be deemed inane. 
So, what are the losses inherent in employing competition law to prohibit free 
competition on the merits when less efficient business will be injured? The first, and 
axiomatic, loss relates to the economic objections to monopoly highlighted above. By 
curtailing the expansion of a large firm’s market share to avail of the various efficiencies 
46 See, e.g., RICHARD WHISH, supra note 8.
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underlying its production and distribution processes, competition law effectively reduces 
the level of industrial output, raises the market clearing price and augments deadweight 
loss. In addition to the myriad of negative effects associated with such loss, the incentive 
on the part of potentially successful firms to engage in the expensive research and 
development needed to attain that superiority is blunted, due to the restriction on an 
efficient firm’s abilities to avail of its meliority. Consumers will inevitably lose in the 
long-run as they are denied access to the fruits of innovation that free competition would 
have provided them.
Moreover, pragmatic as well as theoretical objections arise. First is the major problem of 
articulating a coherent and consistent body of legal principles in formulating an antitrust 
policy protective of politically favored business. Attempting to employ law to such an 
end is apt to result in a series of diametrically-opposed and self-contradictory principles, 
which have to be applied in an ad hoc fashion in order to achieve particularized justice.47
While this may lead to equitable outcomes in certain, particular cases, in the long run the 
lack of legal certainty is likely to lead to further blunting of incentives on the part of 
market actors, whose efforts are value-adding to society. 
Consider the case of a court employing competition law in furtherance of politically-
favored business to prohibit the acquisition of a small business by a larger corporation.48
Prima facie, such a prohibition would seem to be in the best interests of the small 
business-owner specifically and the small business community generally. The owner may 
47 See generally Bork, supra note 3.
48 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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continue in business unperturbed. Yet, closer analysis demonstrates the clear fallacy of 
this reasoning. In attempting to aid the small business-owner now, the court may 
inadvertently hurt the community as a whole by reducing the expected return of starting 
one’s own business. With such acquisitions prohibited, the small business owner cannot 
sell his company. Moreover, it is not clear that the owner purportedly protected by the 
court’s decision will, in fact, be left better off. More likely, the larger firm will enter the 
market regardless and, instead of acquiring his business, will simply price him out of the 
market. The court’s decision, while enacted with the intention of aiding the small 
businessman’s plight, has in fact hurt him.49 To prevent ensuing damage, the court would 
have to forbid pricing below the prevailing price set by the small business owner. But this 
is tantamount to banning competition entirely and represents such a strong application of 
the protectionist argument that no court could, or would, ever employ it.
While it may be concluded that the costs of applying competition rules in protectionist 
fashion are likely to exceed the benefits, this does not mean that the Chicago view 
prevails in practice. In contrast, this all leads to an unavoidable clash between economists 
and politically influential stakeholders. While the United States has seen an almost 
unqualified victory for the economic view, with the Robinson-Patman Act against price 
discrimination providing a quite dramatic exception with politically favored, small 
business interests winning out,50 both current European and historical American law 
appear to display an uneasy balance between the two. Perhaps the clearest illustration of 
protectionism emerges not from Europe, but from the United States during the Warren 
49 See generally RICHARD POSNER, supra note 2, at 126.
50 15 U.S.C. § 13.
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Court era. Ironically, the case so often cited for the Supreme Court’s proclamation that 
“antitrust protects competition, not competitors” is Brown Shoe, perhaps the 
quintessential United States judgment in favor of the protection of individual 
competitors!51
The uneasy balance between economics and politics creates a significant danger of courts 
following the Brown Shoe approach – adhering to the political goal, whilst proclaiming 
adherence to the other. It follows that one must be skeptical of a court’s alleged 
unqualified adoption of the economic approach, for the countervailing political influence 
is considerable and can be expected to permeate through the judicial process. 
Of fundamental importance to this Section, therefore, is the identification of whether EC 
competition law is currently applied to protect competitors as a goal in itself or whether 
such protection is the by-product of a larger purpose. Moreover, if there is a distinction, 
the question must also be asked as to whether the distinction matters. The key to 
achieving all of this is to look to the role of the Freiburg School under European law.
A final manifestation of protectionism arises with respect to the deliberate frustration of 
politically disfavored business. For example, there are those who believe that the 
fundamental reason for the prohibition of the GE/Honeywell merger by the European 
Commission was political. In other words, it has been argued that had the strengthening 
51 Immediately following the Court’s declaration cited above, it held: “But we cannot fail to 
recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally 
owned businesses.” Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
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of two European companies been at issue, the merger would presumably have been 
approved.52
Nevertheless, there is reason to be skeptical of such political conspiracy theories. For one, 
there has been an unprecedented level of international cooperation between the U.S. and 
EC and it seems strange indeed that such cooperation would suddenly be dispensed with 
for no good reason. Second, and more importantly, the reasoning behind the 
Commission’s decision with respect to GE/Honeywell makes perfect sense when 
construed in light of the evolution of European competition law, the various philosophies 
pervading it, and the case law interpreting it. This will become clear momentarily when 
the Freiburg School is considered and the practical differences between ordoliberalism 
and mere protectionism identified. 
As has been made clear, insofar as protectionist principles still pervade European law, 
there is strong ground for repealing them. A more difficult argument awaits with respect 
to the suitability of Freiburg ideology.
• The Overriding Importance of the Market Integration Objective
52 See, e.g., Europe to GE: Go Home, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2001, at A14 (“In the Honeywell 
case, novel antitrust theories have been dreamed up simply because it would be unthinkable to let 
a large U.S. company go about its business unmolested.”)
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Before considering the Freiburg School, however, it is necessary to discuss what is 
perhaps the most important function of EC competition law, namely facilitating the 
furtherance of single market integration. The goal of realizing a single, integrated market 
through the working of a legal competition framework is unique amongst the world’s 
antitrust regimes. In this sense, European antitrust law seeks to serve a goal which has no 
parallel under U.S. law and this observation alone necessitates the question of whether 
complete harmonization of law between the EC and U.S. is desirable, let alone 
achievable. This challenge shall be considered in due course.
A ubiquitous and unwavering trend in EC competition law has involved the unhesitating
condemnation of any business practice seen as creating an obstacle to inter-Member State 
trade or in a manner otherwise likely to frustrate the integration of the single market. An 
example of such an instance is the case of Consten & Grundig, where a manufacturer 
granted one of its dealers an exclusive territory (France).53 Refusing to hear any 
economic justifications, the ECJ condemned the agreement as being contrary to Article 
81 EC due to its impediment to single market integration. 
Yet, it may be seen that this is a highly debatable proposition, for it ignores such factors 
as interbrand competition and the fact that implementation of the distributorship could 
actually have increased trade between France and other countries. Here the Court can be 
seen suffering from myopia. It is indeed true that the restriction imposed by the 
distributor created an insurmountable obstacle to those wishing to engage in intrabrand 
competition in France from other Member States. Yet, the Court did not consider the 
53
 Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten and Grundig v. Commission, E.C.R. 299 (1966).
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likely long-term effect of the restriction on net, interbrand competition between Member 
States. It may well have been that the distributorship was a risky venture and the 
distributor required intrabrand protection in order to enable him to rationally take that 
risk. The restriction, while creating an intrabrand obstacle to the single market, would 
seem to have facilitated an increase in interbrand competition. This elevated level of 
competition would result in higher demand and, hence, higher output. Ceteris paribus, 
one would expect a higher degree of inter-Member State trade, hence furthering the goals 
of the European Community.
This demonstrates how the European Court’s dismissal of economics may have been a 
mistake. The economics of a particular situation must always be assessed to ascertain 
whether a short-run barrier to integration may, in fact, lead to long-run furtherance of the 
single market. It cannot be confidently stated, however, that a pure Chicago approach in 
furtherance of allocative efficiency will always further the single market integration 
principle. In instances where elevated levels of consumer wealth within a particular part 
of the European Union are likely to have a deleterious, long-run effect on free trade 
between Member States, the European Court may be right to strike down the practice. 
But this power must be tempered, without exception, by two considerations: (1) the level 
of integration that has already taken place over the history of the European Union renders 
the principle less worthy of unqualified superiority as in the past,54 & (2) augmented 
allocative efficiency may indirectly further the goals of the single market.
54
 Though this point too must be considered in light of the recent enlargement of the European 
Union to encompass twenty five Member States, which may call for stringent enforcement of 
integration principles with respect to these new countries.
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Interestingly, the single market imperative shares many of the same features in 
application as the Freiburg School, particularly with respect to fairness and the 
elimination of exclusionary practices.55 By preventing mergers likely to increase 
concentration, even if not prices,56 and by holding illegal those unilateral and concerted 
practices designed to make entry into a particular market more time-consuming or costly, 
even where those practices increase efficiency, EC competition law attempts to ensure 
that market actors in various states are granted equal and unrestricted access to the 
relevant market.
Nevertheless, and somewhat counter-intuitively, it is submitted as the major insight of 
this Section that an application of an economic approach to antitrust policy may, in fact, 
serve to further the important European goal of integration, while at the same time 
promoting a more competitive and efficient single market. In other words, the presence of 
barriers – artificial and otherwise – may in many circumstances serve to further long-run 
integration, even if short-term entry is delayed or frustrated. Impressionistic assessment 
of obstacles to single market integration may not only do a disservice to that goal, but 
also frustrate the emergence of an efficiency-enhancing competition policy.
55 See, e.g., David J. Gerber, supra note 16. (“Perceived fairness is central to the entire project of 
European integration. An even and thus "fair" playing field for all market participants has been 
seen as an essential condition for integration of the European market. The central assumption was 
that only where the market is perceived to be fair would nati onal decision makers be willing to 
surrender some of their control over markets and thus allow economic integration.”)
56 Compare U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, Justice Department Requires Divestitures 
General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001), at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8140.htm, with General 
Electric/COMP/M.2220, EC Decision of July 3, 2001, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf.
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• The Freiburg School
The Freiburg School of ordoliberal thought plays a central role in explaining key aspects 
of substantive divergence between the competition regimes of the EC and U.S.. 
Unfortunately, the teachings of the school and the role it has played in shaping antitrust 
policy in Europe have largely escaped the attention of American commentators and 
practitioners.57 Such a lack of attention is an explanatory factor for the kind of misguided 
criticism cited above with respect to both GE/Honeywell and the proclaimed desire on 
the part of the Commission to protect competitors at the expense of consumers. Given the 
relatively obscure role of ordoliberal thinking and the importance it plays both with 
respect to the future development of EC competition law and to international 
harmonization, it is necessary to devote considerable time to the subject.
The Freiburg School’s teachings are decidedly more subtle than mere protection of 
politically favored business and advocate a form of competition policy designed to 
promote consumer welfare through the guaranteed provision of eclectic goods and 
services, coupled with a libertarian right of access to markets, for both consumers and 
businesses. Inherent in this philosophy is a constraint on mass accumulation of power and 
57 See, e.g., David Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-Liberalism, 
Competition Law and the “New” Europe, 42 AMJCL 25 (1994) (“Despite its enormous 
importance, ordoliberal thought -- and German neo-liberal thought generally -- has received little 
attention in the English- speaking world, and it remains all but unknown in the United States.”) In 
1983, one leading German commentator noted that "English language material concerning the 
Freiburg School as a whole has not been found." Wolfgang Fikentscher, II Wirtschaftsrecht 40 n. 
59 (1983).
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capital in the hands of any one entity. Essentially, ordoliberalism calls for ease of access 
to information, freedom of choice and the equitable distribution of wealth – three features 
that one would strain, employing any definition, to find unrelated to the notion of 
consumer welfare. In sharp contrast, indeed, the Freiburg School is very much concerned 
with promoting the well-being of consumers and it seems clear that its style of thinking 
has been incorporated within the evolution of EC competition law. Yet, it is equally clear 
that an irreconcilable tension may sometimes arise between furthering the goals of the 
Freiburg School and maximizing consumer wealth in a manner consistent with Chicago. 
It is this tension that has led, in part, to the divergence in substantive antitrust law 
witnessed today.
• The Roots of the Freiburg School
The substantive arguments of the Freiburg School cannot be understood without 
reference to their historical development.58 Neoliberalism in Germany arose out of the 
debacle that was the Weimar Republic and developed through the totalitarian and 
oppressive Nazi regime. The neoliberal thinkers were repulsed by the economic and legal 
structure that permeated the Weimar Republic and were equally aghast at the policies –
economic, social and political – of the Nazi era. Central to neoliberal thought was the 
goal of preventing the emergence of the kind of institutional and socio-economic failures 
that led to the turbulent and tragic history in question.
58
 For an excellent discussion of the rise of ordoliberal thought, on which the author strongly 
relies, see David Gerber, supra note 58.
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The Weimer Republic arose following the controversial end to World War I, which many 
Germans viewed with resentment, having held the belief that Germany was not in fact 
losing the war. Much anger and bitterness was directed toward the Weimar Republic that 
arose in the context of the pervasive mood of the day. Given this fact alone, the new 
governmental structure faced grave difficulties. Perhaps inevitably, the institutions of the 
Weimar Republic lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the public and this led to the 
concomitant failure, and perhaps usurpation, of the judicial process. “Law increasingly 
came to be viewed as a tool of power rather than a reliable social institution,”59 with the 
ubiquitous nationalist support in the courts resulting in a number of miscarriages of 
justice against socialists. This culminated in a profound public dissatisfaction and lack of 
faith in the institutions of the government.
The economic structure of the Weimar Republic was similarly disastrous. In addition to 
the ravages to the economy of war, the country faced heavy – some would say excessive 
and unfair – reparations and an unprecedented inflation rate. Faced with such an 
economic climate, it will be of little surprise to learn that the firms comprising the various 
markets within the Republic sought action in concert to survive and to maintain 
profitability. The result was an increasingly severe level of cartelization and a 
concomitant predation of any firms wishing to engage in free competition.
Such was the context of the Nazi assumption of power in 1933.
59 Id. at 27.
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It was in 1933, during this chaotic time, that two lawyers – Franz Bohm and Hanns 
Grossman – and one economist – Walter Eucken – crossed paths in the relatively 
secluded town of Freiburg, only to discover “that they had similar readings of the failing 
of Weimar and similar views of what to do about it.”60 They readily attributed the socio-
economic and political breakdown of the Weimar Republic to the fatally flawed legal 
institutions and the resulting failure to check the abusive exercise of economic power by 
cartels and monopolists. Due to Freiburg’s seclusion, members of the School were able to 
pursue their scholarship throughout the Nazi era and, as a result, were uniquely placed at 
the end of the war to provide a socio-economic model upon which to rebuild West 
Germany – a model, of course, that was pleasing to the United States given its distance 
from the extreme politics of the preceding era and those of the Soviet Union.
• The Central Tenets of Ordoliberalist Thought
Given the historical context to the rise of the Freiburg School, the central tenets of 
ordoliberalist thought are by no means shocking. As eloquently and succinctly explained 
by David Gerber:
“Against the backdrop of chaos, devastation and amassed power, the ordoliberals 
set out to create a tolerant and humane society that would protect human dignity 
and personal freedom. Drawing on the central values of classical liberalism, they 
envisioned a society in which individuals were as free as possible… The Weimar 
experience led ordoliberals to demand the dispersion of not only political power, 
but economic power as well. For most, this meant the elimination of monopolies. 
For others, such as Wilhelm Ropke, the concentration of economic resources was 
60 Id. at 29.
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an evil unto itself; they sought an economy composed, to the extent possible, of 
small and medium-sized firms. Both groups tended to view economic 
concentration with suspicion and sought to protect the existence and the economic 
freedom of small and medium-sized businesses.”61
Thus, the Freiburg School does not seek to spurn the competitive process so as to protect 
politically influential business or “state champions” at the expense of consumers. Rather, 
it takes a hostile view to the accumulation of economic power within the control of a 
single entity, recognizing such concentration as a potential danger to consumers and 
society at large; such views emanating from the empirically unquestionable harm having 
resulted from unchecked concentration during the Weimar Republic. Most interestingly, 
this does not mean that the ordoliberals opposed competition. Quite to the contrary, they 
embraced it, viewing an effective competitive process as being at the heart of a socio-
economic structure that would maximize consumer welfare and political stability, so as to 
avoid the possibility of recidivism. Walter Eucken, a key figure in the rise of the Freiburg 
School,62 envisioned an intense competitive process as being at the heart of reform. 
Indeed, the greater the degree of competition, the more closely reality would match the 
ordoliberal ideal.
Consistent with those who view the source of competition law as allocative efficiency,63
ordoliberals view price- or output-fixing concerted action as inimical to consumer 
welfare. Indeed, insofar as both schools of thought recognize the possibility of improper 
61 Id. at 36.
62 Id. at 39 (“Called by Friedrich Hayek "the most serious thinker in the area of social philosophy 
that Germany had produced in a century," Walter Eucken was the primary architect of the 
methodological and philosophical framework of ordoliberalism.”)
63 See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, supra note 3; RICHARD POSNER, supra note 2.
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exclusion of rival firms,64 both agree that prohibition of the offending practice is in 
consumers’ best interests.
Nevertheless, the function and role of the competitive process conceived by the Freiburg 
School is quite remarkably different, in many respects, from that pronounced by the 
Chicago School, which seeks to maximize consumer wealth, even if achieving that 
requires monopolization by the most efficient competitor. Rather, under the ordoliberal 
view enunciated by Eucken, monopolization is to be avoided at all costs and access to the 
markets must be guaranteed. No emergence of excessive economic power, or abuse of 
such clout against rivals and potential entrants, can be tolerated, for it was precisely such 
unchecked action that provided the backdrop for Germany’s tragic situation following 
World War I.
An excellent contrast between the role of competition as envisioned by the Freiburg 
School and those adhering to an economic approach is provided by Calixto Salomão 
Filho, who writes:
“For the Ordo-liberals, the great advantage of the competition system is the fact 
that through the transmission of information and freedom of choice, it allows the 
discovery of the better available options and the most rational behaviors. This is 
Hayek’s classic definition of the competition system as a Entdeckungsverfahren 
(discovery process). The existence of a free choice process and discovery of the 
best options in the market depends on not only the existence of a price that is not 
altered by artificial offer and demand conditions, which would represent the 
64
 Richard Posner has acknowledged the possibility of a firm excluding “an equally or more 
efficient rival,” though this prospect is not recognized by Robert Bork. For a discussion of this 
issue, see Michael A. Carrier, Antitrust After the Interception: Of a Heroic Returner and Myriad 
Paths; A Review of Richard Posner, Antitrust Law (2d ed. 2001), (Mar. 2002), at
www.antitrustsource.com (book review).
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marginal utility of a product, as the Neoclassics wish, but also on the existence of 
actual or potential possibilities of choice among products, based on price, quality, 
regional preferences, etc. The possibility of choice has its own value.”65
In essence, the role of competition under the Freiburg philosophy is to prevent 
cartelization, monopolization and excessive concentration, to guarantee open access to 
markets, to facilitate the free movement of goods and information and to generate 
cooperation, coherence and political stability.66
• The Incorporation of the Freiburg School into EC Competition Law
In some respects, it would initially seem surprising that a German school of socio-
economic thought, developed in large part during the time frame of, albeit in opposition 
to, the Nazi regime, would come to pervade European competition policy. Yet, closer 
inspection reveals a number of reasons why Germany did indeed play a particularly 
influential role with respect to the development of EC competition law.67 First, with the 
end of the war and in a political climate seeking economic cooperation, the Freiburg 
School was uniquely equipped with socio-economic theories capable of providing the 
65 Calixto Salomão Filho, Legal Theory of Economic Knowledge, at
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/sela/esalamao.pdf.
66
 For a classic statement of the ordoliberal function of competition, see F.A. HAYED, 
INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER, Chicago, (The University of Chicago Press 1948) at 106 
(“Competition is essentially a process of the formation of opinion: by spreading information, it 
creates that unity and coherence of the economic system which we presuppose when we think of 
it as one market. It creates the views people have about what is best and cheapest, and it is 
because of it that people know at least as much about possibilities and opportunities as they in 
fact do. It is thus a process which involves a continuous change in the data and whose 
significance must therefore be completely missed by any theory which treats these data as 
constant.”)
67 See, e.g., David J. Gerber, supra note 16 (“Germany has played a special role in the 
development of competition law in Europe and this role is particularly important for 
understanding the evolution of fairness concerns.”)
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foundation for an economy based on the principles of integration and free market access. 
Second, during the founding of the European Economic Community, “[m]ost of the 
leading German representatives… were closely associated with ordoliberalism or at least 
shared an appreciation of it.”68 Third, the Germans unquestionably had the most 
experience with respect to competition law, having “just passed Europe’s first modern 
competition statute. As a result, they emerged as leaders in this area – as illustrated, for 
example, by the appointment of von der Groeben as the first Commissioner for 
Competition Policy of the European Commission.”69
The overall result was that “ordoliberal thought set the tone for thinking about 
competition law within the Communities.”70
We can now appreciate the importance of this school of thought in potentially explaining 
some of the divergence between the U.S. and EC discussed above. Ordoliberal thinking 
differs markedly from the economic thinking of the Chicago School and, to the extent 
that its influence remains strong within Europe, it constitutes a possibly serious obstacle 
to realizing the goals of global harmonization. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the 
on-going influence of the Freiburg School in modern European competition law.
First, however, it is important to ask a fundamental question: in what respects, if any, are 
the goals of the Freiburg School different from those simply designed to protect small 
and medium-sized firms from their larger, more efficient, rivals? If the distinction is 
68 Id. at 71.
69 Id. at 73.
70 Id. at 73.
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merely illusory, it will have major ramifications for the analysis conducted heretofore and 
below.
• Distinguishing ordoliberal thought from the mere protection of small business
It is unquestionably the case that ordoliberal competition policy often has protection of 
weaker business as its effect. The vital question, therefore, is whether ordoliberal thought, 
for all its ostensibly sophisticated theoretical foundation, is functionally equivalent to the 
simple protection of politically favored business – an object discussed above and found, 
for a number of reasons, to be disfavored. After all, what does it matter if protectionism is 
the goal or effect of a practice when the end is the same? 
The conclusion seems inescapable that, in many instances, there is little practical 
difference between the two in terms of effect. Whether a court wishes to protect weaker 
business against more efficient rivals on either the ground that said business is politically 
favored, or on the ground of fairness, the legal ruling is likely to be analogous to that 
applied in furtherance of ordoliberal principles seeking to avoid concentration. So 
construed, the preceding discussion of the role of Freiburg in Europe serves an 
explanatory role only and is, as a practical matter, defunct. The American criticism cited 
in Section One as short-sighted could be astute after all.
However, it is submitted that an important difference between these two instructive 
theories can and does arise. When the decisive factor is consumer welfare, as defined by 
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the Freiburg School, rather than protection of business, one would expect to see instances 
of increases in consumer wealth following a firm’s employment of an efficiency-
enhancing practice to be weighed against the concern of elevated levels of concentration 
in the future. Such an approach may lead, in some instances, to a clear divergence 
between protectionist and ordoliberal principles. Of course, where a practice leads to the 
elimination of all incumbent competition, though higher consumer wealth, one would 
expect a Freiburg court to find the resulting concentration to be prohibitively malignant. 
Yet, at the margin, evidence of a court disregarding significant, though not total, harm to 
incumbent competitors in favor of immediate consumer welfare would provide 
convincing evidence that Europe adheres to ordoliberal views, as contrasted to a basic 
principle of protecting competitors as an end in and of itself.
It can now be demonstrated how Freiburg thinking is distinguishable from the protection 
of politically influential business. Such protection takes place without regard to the best 
interests of consumers. Protection of less efficient business under ordoliberal thinking is 
quite different and is grounded in the notion of consumer welfare. 
The significance of the Freiburg School in playing a role distinct from mere protectionist 
principles is evident from a consideration of EC competition law.
First, clear evidence exists that dominant firms can monopolize a market, or otherwise 
harm competitors, by virtue of its efficiency alone and where consumers benefit.71
71 See e.g., GOYDER, EC COMPETITION LAW, (Oxford University Press 4th Ed 2003) at 343 (“it is 
not the monopoly or quasi-monopoly on its own that can be challenged but its abuse.”)
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Moreover, dominant firms are permitted to injure their rivals when consumers benefit as 
a result. Consider the case of Irish Sugar v. Commission, where the Court of First 
Instance held that an undertaking’s protection of a dominant position “must… in order to 
be lawful, be based on criteria of economic efficiency and consistent with the interests of 
consumers.”72 Were a purely protectionist approach to be taken by the courts, it is 
unlikely that a dominant firm would be allowed to injure its rival firms, even on the basis 
of inherent efficiency. Instead, the CFI here provides an indication of the fact that EC 
competition law seeks to protect consumers and where the efficiencies enjoyed by a 
dominant firm are such as to outweigh concerns of concentration, the utilization of such 
efficiencies should be permitted. 
In this respect, EC law is analogous to the law as classically stated by Judge Learned 
Hand in the United States: “a single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active 
companies, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry… The successful 
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”73
Consider also the case of Atlantic Container Line AB v. Commission, which held that 
even an agreement creating a dominant position, to the obvious detriment of the 
contracting parties’ incumbent opposition, can take place without challenge under EC 
competition law where such acquisition results from superior efficiency that will benefit 
72
 Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. II-2969, [1999] 5 C.M.L.R. 1300, para 
189.
73 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir 1945).
39
consumers in the long run.74 Obviously such an agreement is to the disadvantage of all 
competitors not privy thereto, but the court looked past the harm to individual 
competitors to find a concomitant increase in consumer welfare likely to flow from the 
agreement. This makes the distinction between ordoliberal and protectionist principles 
explicit. The latter philosophy would condemn an agreement harming other competitors 
in the market whereas the former would weigh the clear short-run consumer benefit 
against the possible long-run harm thereto as a result of increasing concentration. Such 
balancing under the ordoliberal view does not involve a foregone conclusion and where 
the benefits of rising concentration to consumers are clear, Freiburg-based jurisprudence 
will permit the acts in question.
In addition, a number of Commission decisions finding certain mergers to be compatible 
with the common market have also focused on the benefit to consumers of the resulting 
concentration in elevating the level of competition in the market. So, in the Saint-Gobain/ 
BPB merger, the Commission concluded that that the bundling likely to take place by the 
merged entity would compel similar bundling on the part of incumbent competitors in 
order to survive the enhanced level of competition to the ultimate benefit of consumers.75
The fact that European law seeks to protect consumers, and not necessarily competitors, 
can be made clear employing a number of other explanatory cases, but the most succinct 
of these must surely be Article 81(3), which allows the exemption of agreements whose 
74
 Case T-395/94, Atlantic Container Line AB v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. II-875, [2002] 4 
C.M.L.R. 1232, para 330.
75 See, e.g., Commission Decision of 09.11.2005 declaring a concentration to be compatible with 
the common market (Case No COMP / M.3943 - SAINT-GOBAIN / BPB) according to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 at para 59.
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anticompetitive effects are shown to be outweighed by benefits to consumers, as opposed 
to competitors themselves.76
Evidence is provided by Article 81 (3)’s express requirement that a fair share of any 
benefits from an agreement flow to consumers. This is, once again, consistent with 
ordoliberal principles, but it is not clear that such a requirement would exist under a 
purely protectionist regime. In such a context, one would imagine that the requirement 
under 81(3) would be to the effect that no elimination of competitors would result from 
the agreement in question. Yet, such is not the case. Instead, the closest provision is that 
no substantial elimination of competition take place. Is this synonymous with harm to 
competitors? There is reason to believe that it is not. First, the requirement of 
“substantial” harm should be noted. Evidently, harm ensuing from an agreement to 
competitors within a market will not prevent the application of Article 81(3) if it is not 
sufficiently severe.
Perhaps the clearest evidence that consumer welfare – economically defined – is the 
fundamental consideration in assessing the legality of potentially anticompetitive 
agreements is provided by recent Commission Guidelines.77 Given that the European 
Commission is the primary driving force behind EC competition law, evidence of its 
belief that consumer welfare, as opposed to mere harm to competitors, is the fundamental 
76 See, e.g., Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the XXXIIIrd Report on 
Competition Policy – 2003, OJ 2005 C221/1, at 2.3 (“The Commission will express a favourable 
opinion in cases where agreements between companies do not restrict competition on the relevant 
markets, and where consumers benefit from the cooperation.”)
77 Communication from the Commission - Notice - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) 
of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 97, at 93.
41
standard on which to base a judgment as to the legality of an agreement provides the 
basis for the confident inference that EC antitrust is primarily concerned with consumers.
In the Guidelines, the Commission goes so far as to stress that efficiencies flowing to 
consumers from an agreement may be subtle and one must take care to accurately 
identify and weigh them against the competitive harms identified under Article 81 (1).78
The Commission’s focus on consumer welfare displayed a strong reliance on economic 
theory, fully consistent within the context to the Chicago approach, emphasizing that:
“Cost efficiencies may in some circumstances lead to increased output and lower 
prices for the affected consumers. If due to cost efficiencies the undertakings in 
question can increase profits by expanding output, consumer pass-on may occur. 
In assessing the extent to which cost efficiencies are likely to be passed on to 
consumers… 
All factors must normally be considered. Since Article 81(3) only applies in cases 
where competition on the market is being appreciably restricted… there can be no 
presumption that residual competition will ensure that consumers receive a fair 
share of the benefits… it is necessary to balance the two opposing forces resulting 
from the restriction of competition and the cost efficiencies. On the one hand, any 
increase in market power caused by the restrictive agreement gives the 
undertakings concerned the ability and incentive to raise price. On the other hand, 
the types of cost efficiencies that are taken into account may give the 
undertakings concerned an incentive to reduce price…
The effects of these two opposing forces must be balanced against each other. It is 
recalled in this regard that the consumer pass-on condition incorporates a sliding 
scale. When the agreement causes a substantial reduction in the competitive 
constraint facing the parties, extraordinarily large cost efficiencies are normally 
required for sufficient pass-on to occur.”
78 Id. at 93.
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These 2004 Guidelines convincingly prove that EC competition law is far more 
sophisticated than merely trying to protect competitors. Consumer welfare is at the heart 
of the process and the Commission makes explicitly clear the fact that economic 
efficiencies being passed onto consumers is of central importance and that even 
substantial harm to competitors can be outweighed by elevated consumer wealth. In 
addition, actual Article 81 (3) decisions demonstrate the importance of benefit to 
consumers, as opposed to lack of harm to individual competitors.79
Given such reliance on consumer welfare, how can one explain the Commission’s 
decision in GE/Honeywell? There, the U.S. Department of Justice approved the merger 
on the ground of complementary effects likely to follow therefrom. Carlton and Perloff 
describe the phenomenon as follows:
“[W]hen a single firm prices two complementary products, it takes into account that 
lowering the price on one product will stimulate demand for the other. This demand 
effect creates an incentive for the firm to set lower prices for both products than would be 
set if each product were sold by a different firm. Thus, one should expect lower prices 
and consumer benefits . . . ”80
On the basis of such reasoning, the Justice Department approved the merger for being in 
furtherance of consumer welfare.81 Why did the European Commission not follow suit? Why did 
it flaunt economic evidence of complementary effects increasing consumer welfare? Is it 
79 See, e.g., Visa International — Multilateral Interchange Fee, 2002 O.J. (L318) 17, [2003] 4 
C.M.L.R. 283 (where the complaints of competitors were rejected in face of consumer-welfare 
enhancing network effects to be availed of by the agreement). See also TPS 1999 O.J. (L90) 6, 
[1999] 5 C.M.L.R. 168, paras 135-138, upheld on appeal by the CFI Case T-112/99, Metropole 
Television SA v. Commission, 2001 ECR II-2459,  [2001] 5 C.M.L.R. 1236.
80 CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 29.
81 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, Justice Department Requires Divestitures General Electric 
and Honeywell (May 2, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8140.htm.
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because the Commission abandoned its focus on consumers and instead adopted 
protectionist principles, as has been suggested by a number of U.S. commentators? It 
seems most unlikely. More probable is that the GE/Honeywell decision reflected the 
Commission’s belief that the predicted long-run increase in concentration in the relevant 
markets would be ultimately harmful to consumers. This is entirely consistent with 
ordoliberal beliefs and reflects the philosophy that a lack of concentration in a market is 
likely to a long-run furtherance of consumer welfare. It would appear that the decisive 
factor in the Commission’s reasoning lay in its belief that GE/Honeywell’s increased 
efficiency would lead to the long-run exit of incumbent competitors, with the result that 
consumers would be denied meaningful choice.82 This is a clear manifestation of the 
Freiburg School’s philosophy.
The tension between Freiburg and Chicago principles is very real. In the 2004
Guidelines, the Commission can plainly be seen adopting the latter view, insofar as it is 
facilitative of the former. Meanwhile, other instances, as illustrated by GE/Honeywell,
have seen ordoliberal thinking clearly prevailing when placed in conflict with Chicago. 
What is certain is that there is more to European jurisprudence than the mere protection 
of incumbent business. The consumer appears to play the critical role.
• Questioning the Role of Ordoliberalism in a Modern Europe
82 General Electric/COMP/M.2220, EC Decision of July 3, 2001, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf.
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Having surveyed the various theoretical bases underpinning competition policy in Europe 
and the United States, the crucially important task of identifying the optimal theory by 
which to inform antitrust policy arises. Only when a single standard emerges will genuine 
harmonization be able to take place between the U.S. and the EC. Until that time, 
cooperation can be achieved and many, indeed most, cases will be resolved in parallel 
manner, but when instances arise in which the two jurisdictions’ differing jurisprudential 
bases come in conflict, more scenarios reminiscent of GE/Honeywell will occur. Taking 
as given that both the U.S. and EC share the ultimate desire of maximizing consumer 
welfare, the challenge is to identify which theory, or amalgam of theories, is most likely 
to further this goal.
The continued presence of ordoliberal thought within EC competition policy in the 21st
century is the major point of contention for this paper. It will be argued that the Freiburg 
School, while making a valuable and quite proper contribution to socio-economic 
progress in its historical context, is now anachronistic and stands in the way of economic, 
political and international progress. Indeed, it is submitted that the fundamental tenet of 
the Freiburg School – that the competitive process will disintegrate and collapse into a 
series of monopolized and heavily concentrated industries to the ultimate harm of 
consumers and society83 – has not been borne out by the realities of the U.S. model. Such 
a lack of faith in the functioning of the free market may be attributed to the historical 
83 Id. at 50 (“for Eucken and his colleagues, history -- particularly Weimar history -- had 
demonstrated that competition tended to collapse… The recurring self-destruction of economic 
freedom, particularly during the 1920s, was the story that informed their thought relating to 
competition law… The ordoliberals viewed competition law as a means of preventing this 
degeneration of the competitive process.”)
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context in which ordoliberal thinking emerged. There is good reason to be more 
optimistic about the self-correcting nature of competition today. 
When one appreciates the further point that the various objections to monopolization, 
highlighted within the discussion of the Chicago School, become reality when efficiency-
and consumer-welfare enhancing business practices are forbidden on the grounds of 
possible future levels of concentration, the conclusion seems almost inescapable that the 
Freiburg School’s influence is no longer appropriate.
The strongest ground for the Freiburg approach relates to the alleged inability of 
consumers to act in their best long-term interests. However, a careful consideration of 
this assumption will demonstrate that it is ultimately unconvincing.
It was demonstrated above that protection of less efficient business under ordoliberal 
thinking is quite different from a purely protectionist view and is grounded in the notion 
of consumer welfare. How could it ever be necessary to protect consumers from their 
own free will?, one might ask. Consumers can, and do, shop around for the best deals. If 
they are attracted to lower prices, even from larger corporations, surely this is a 
democratic expression of their preference? In such circumstances, one may readily 
question the role of competition law in creating a barrier to consumers’ attainment of 
those preferences.
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Yet, it may fairly be observed that this discussion places a lot of faith in consumers as a 
group to act in furtherance of their best interests. Perhaps it is useful to relax this 
assumption and analyze a more paternalistic view. What if consumers suffer from 
myopia, being attracted to low prices without giving due regard to the level of 
unwelcome concentration likely to follow in the long run? There is an extensive literature 
on the problem of low-income segments of society who face significant capital 
constraints discounting the future at a vastly excessive rate.84
Moreover, a classic collective action problem arises. While every consumer may desire a 
lack of excessive concentration in the future, every consumer also has an incentive to free 
ride off the actions of others. In other words, each consumer maximizes his utility by 
availing of the low prices being offered by the increasingly large corporation whilst
relying on other consumers to spend greater amounts of money purchasing the same 
goods from smaller, less efficient, businesses. This is a classic prisoners’ dilemma 
situation. Each consumer’s dominant strategy is to purchase from the large firm at lower 
prices, for if all other consumers purchase from small stores at high prices, the consumer 
in question maximizes his possible payoff – lower prices now and a lack of excessive 
concentration in the future. If other consumers purchase from the large, efficient, firm, 
the consumer in question will not be unilaterally capable of preventing the future state of 
concentration and may as well maximize his utility by availing of the low prices now. As 
84 See, e.g., Kirk R. Smith, Poverty and Climate Change: Cause, Effect, or Effect Modifier, at
http://ehs.sph.berkeley.edu/krsmith/publications/03_smith_3.pdf (“It is nearly a tautology to say 
that poor people and their nations generally act as if they have short time horizons or, in the 
jargon of the analyst, high discount rates. Anecdote and analysis confirm it.”)
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a result, the Nash equilibrium will result in increasing concentration, which is antithetical 
to the joint maximization solution. 
Taking these insights at face value, a significant problem arises with respect to the 
Chicago approach. Defining the maximization of consumer welfare, as Chicago does, by 
price and output, surely a danger readily emerges where consumers face a collective 
action problem, or excessively discount the future state of the world, that an unattractive 
level of concentration will result? The Freiburg School would seem to think so and its 
provisions implicitly recognize that competition law can be employed to defeat the 
collective action problem above.
But this question is itself short-sighted, for if concentration of economic power in the 
hands of major corporations is viewed as a source of disutility for consumers, who would 
prefer access to family-owned and other small- and medium-sized businesses, then that
prevalent dissatisfaction translates into a major source of competitive advantage for such 
businesses to enter the market once unwelcome concentration has taken place. This is the 
critical point. One would expect rapid entry to avail of such demand.
If a market structure fails to induce entry by small and medium-sized business once an 
“objectionable” and readily observable level of concentration has emerged, a strong 
argument can be made for rejecting the principles of the Freiburg School. 
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Importantly, with an unwelcome level of concentration having taken place, afflicted 
consumers would be expected to actively purchase from small firms entering the market. 
Excessive discounting of the future is no longer a problem once the future objectionable 
state of the world has actually arisen. In addition, interest groups could be created by 
consumer protection groups to help overcome the collective action problem. Moreover, 
small firms could enter through a joint venture, using a common brand or trade mark as a 
signaling effect to consumers of their small or familial status.
Thus, where no long-run entry is observed, the only explanation is that consumers are 
benefiting from the low-cost pricing and do not, in fact, desire less efficient, small 
business. Thus, a judicial or legislative rule providing a barrier to consumer welfare-
enhancing actions by “dominant” and efficient firms looks not like a paternalistic 
protection of long-term consumer interests, but an authoritarian imposition of a political 
viewpoint not shared by society’s constituents – consumers. This insight gains a special 
force when one recognizes that majoritarian distaste of concentration is not required for 
small- and medium-sized business to gain a competitive foothold. Even 5% of consumers 
desiring the availability of family-owned enterprise provides a massive source of 
business for such a company contemplating entry into the market. One would expect 
limited entry, with 5% of consumers being supplied by small business, and the remaining 
95% maximizing their utility by purchasing from the most efficient firms offering the 
lowest prices. An absence of even limited scale entry strongly indicates a complete lack 
of consumer demand for such family business and that consumers are in fact benefiting 
from the lower prices. 
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The strongest ground for rejecting the Freiburg School, however, relates to the rise of the 
so-called “new economy,” which is playing an increasingly central and important role in 
the global market. Such markets are often characterized by high fixed costs, economies of 
scale and, hence, falling average costs in production with the result that the markets lack
a long-run competitive equilibrium.85 Such network industries are often said to have 
“winner takes all” characteristics flowing from “tipping effects.” Enforcing ordoliberal
ideology in the context of the new economy is apt to be disastrous. Imposing a multi-firm 
market structure on an industry whose underlying characteristics call for only one 
manufacturer creates a situation of massive inefficiency. Prices will be far higher than 
would be the case under unconstrained competition. Moreover, heavy administrative 
expenses would have to be incurred to maintain an artificial equilibrium in the market 
and these would constitute an additional loss. 
In addition, the most meaningful form of competition with respect to the new economy 
may relate to innovation and standard setting.86 Where “tipping effects” are especially 
strong, leading to consumer acceptance of a sole standard, monopolization may be almost 
inevitable. While the Freiburg School would not necessarily prohibit the existence of the 
monopoly, if its emergence could not be practically avoided, it would both require open 
85 See generally OZ SHY, THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES (Cambridge University 
Press 2001).
86 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER supra note 2, at 248 (“The features of the new economy that I have 
been describing… tug it toward monopolization yet, oddly, toward competition. The paradox is 
dissolved by remembering that competition to obtain a monopoly is an important form of 
competition. The more protection from competition the firm that succeeds in obtaining a 
monopoly will enjoy, the more competition there will be to become that monopolist . . . this 
competition may be wholly desirable.”)
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access to rivals and prohibit any practice creating a hindrance to free entry. Such 
requirements serve to reduce the reward earned by the successful innovator. As such 
potential innovators expend capital on their risky research and development on the basis 
of recoupment and reward through subsequent monopoly, ordoliberal principles would 
vastly truncate the ex ante expenditure on innovation, hence frustrating the emergence of 
new economy industries. It is clear that ordoliberal policies are incompatible with the 
competitive processes of the new economy. The consideration of the Commission’s 
proposed remedy with respect to Microsoft below makes clear the damage likely to flow 
from the Europeans’ treatment of exclusionary practices in this novel context.
Interestingly, however, the conclusion that the Freiburg School’s influence should be 
filtered from EC competition law is not as straightforward as one would initially imagine, 
given the force of the above concerns. Before concluding that a rejection of ordoliberal 
jurisprudence within EC competition law should take place, a number of arguments for 
continuing adherence to Freiburg shall be considered.
First, it is worth considering a possible economic base for the Freiburg School whereby 
even an approach to antitrust in pursuit of maximization of consumer welfare may find 
increasing concentration on grounds of efficiency objectionable.
From an economic perspective, the Freiburg School’s insight is most compelling in the 
case of a firm whose efficiency in production enables it to achieve a monopoly, but where 
the efficiency thus generated is outweighed by the social loss of the ensuing 
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supracompetitive pricing. Assuming that no company is in a position by which to enter 
and challenge this monopoly, due, for example, to the perceived likelihood of predatory 
price-cutting behavior on the part of the incumbent,87 it may be that consumer welfare 
would be maximized in the long run by employing competition law to prevent the 
company attaining a monopolistic position in the first place. For this to be the case, the 
constraining influence created by less efficient, incumbent competition on the price 
elasticity of demand facing the efficient firm must be greater than that which would be 
created by the threat of entry to the efficient firm were it allowed to attain a monopoly. 
However, not only is there reason to be skeptical about the realism of such an outcome, 
but the recognition of such a principle is apt to be extremely dangerous. This is 
particularly so with respect to the incentive to compete aggressively on price, to innovate 
and to engage in research and development. In short, recognition of such a principle 
would blunt the fundamental process of competition. Rivalry between undertakings for 
customers’ business leads to price-cutting, cost-reduction through increased efficiency 
and innovation with the ultimate goal of increasing market share and profitability. The 
imposition of a constraint on further growth by competition law would prevent further 
desirable instances of this sort of competition. Moreover, it is apt to be prohibitively 
difficult to accurately identify the point at which to employ the law to curtail the further 
87
 Though not, interestingly, due to the fact that the entrant’s price would be above the 
incumbent’s monopoly price, for in that case the entrant’s inefficiency is of such an extent as to 
render that company’s existence an irrelevant factor in the incumbent’s first order condition for 
profit maximization. If such were the case, the fact of the incumbent’s uncontested monopoly is 
an unequivocally desirable outcome.
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growth in market share of an efficient company. It is likely that a large number of Type I 
errors would result.88
The second obstacle to striking Freiburg principles from EC law lies in the following 
observation: the recent enlargement of the European Union to incorporate ten additional 
Member States, of which seven – the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary and Slovenia – had Communist or Socialist regimes during the Cold 
War period, provides an economic situation more akin to the context in which the 
Freiburg School arose than would the modern economies of the western European 
countries and the United States. As a result, ordoliberal thinking may still have a role to 
play with respect to these economically developing countries. The relevant issue is which 
jurisprudential foundation of competition law – allocative efficiency or ordoliberalism –
would be expected to most effectively aid in these countries’ economic development.
Given the overwhelming economic support for free trade through comparative – as 
opposed to absolute – advantage,89 a strong case can be made that a competition policy 
focusing on allocative efficiency, which would facilitate a country’s maximization of 
comparative advantage by minimizing domestic costs of production, would be best 
placed to enable these developing Member States to successfully integrate with the 
European Union.
88
 In other words, many situations would arise where an efficient firm increasing market share to 
the benefit of consumer-welfare would nevertheless be mistakenly deemed objectionable.
89 See, e.g., GIANCARLO GANDOLFO, INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND POLICY, (Springer
1998); NIGEL GIRMWADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: A CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS, 
(Routledge 1996).
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Third, and as was considered above, a unique and fundamentally important characteristic 
of EC competition law is the overriding priority given single market integration. The case 
can reasonably be made that ordoliberal thought, with its emphasis on keeping access to 
markets open and unhindered provides an ideal foundation upon which to base a 
competition policy that seeks to guarantee transparency between its Member States’ 
borders. The United States simply does not share such a goal in employing its antitrust 
regime and, if some divergence in international competition policy emerges, perhaps it is 
simply unavoidable. Critical to resolution of this issue will be the predicted effect on 
single market integration of a competition regime dedicated solely to achieving allocative 
efficiency and consumer welfare maximization.
Perhaps, some would argue that the ideal outcome is for the EC and the U.S. to adopt an 
amalgam of the Chicago and Freiburg Schools, in which the gains of allocative efficiency 
are recognized, but subject to the limit that excessive concentration may represent a 
social evil over the long-run, short-run efficiencies notwithstanding. This would involve 
the United States, as opposed to the European Community, altering its antitrust policy, 
perhaps in a manner more reflective of ordoliberal thinking. This suggestion is by no 
means unprecedented. 90 This is due to the fact that European competition law currently 
represents such an amalgam, with neither the Freiburg nor Chicago School influences 
enjoying unqualified application, rather each being applied in proportion to the other.
Yet, while such an approach has some theoretical backing within the European Union, 
given the single market integration imperative, it is not at all clear why such an approach 
90 See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, supra note 2.
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would be optimal within the United States. Moreover, and as was outlined above, the 
market integration principle is by no means diametrically opposed to the pursuit of 
economic efficiency. It follows that ordoliberal thinking can be jettisoned in light of 
modern economic thought and an antitrust policy in pursuit of consumer wealth adopted, 
qualified only by those instances where efficiency-enhancing practices would 
nevertheless create a long-run obstacle to the single market. 
It is submitted that an economic approach to competition policy, as a modified variant of 
the Chicago School theory, is not only the best route by which to maximize consumer 
welfare, but, critically, is also generally consistent with the single market imperative that 
underlies the jurisprudence of the EC generally.
In order to gain an appreciation of how ordoliberal thought pervades European antitrust, 
it is best to compendiously survey a number of branches of the law. Adopting the 
fundamental teaching of the Chicago School that consumer welfare is to be furthered by 
lower prices and higher output as the optimal standard, we can therefore proceed to 
identify representative areas of divergence. In so doing, it must be recalled that the 
ultimate goal from this paper’s perspective is to achieve the greatest possible allocative, 
distributive and productive efficiency and, ceteris paribus, the most effective way to 
attain this goal is to promote the process of vigorous competition so as to avoid cases of 
monopoly. It will be concurrently shown how the law covering these areas can be 
amended in a manner reflective of the principles outlined above and how such 
amendment will be to the benefit of consumers and the economy as a whole.
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• Identifying and Challenging the Freiburg School in EC Competition Law
It is unquestionable that the message of the Freiburg School can still be seen pervading 
EC competition law, particularly with respect to the scrutiny given the requirement of 
fairness on the part of dominant firms’ behavior and the hostility with which any 
exclusionary actions are viewed, irrespective of the efficiency underlying such conduct. 
In particular, the “as if” aspect of ordoliberal competition policy, which requires 
monopolists to behave “as if” they faced competition,91 features heavily in the European 
Court of Justice’s rulings with respect to the concept of “abuse of dominant position.”
The fact of dominance itself is not prohibited. Divestiture is not sought. Instead, and in 
contrast to the approach typically adopted in the United States, firms classified as 
dominant face equitable constraints on their behavior, being subjected to a “special 
responsibility” not to behave unfairly,92 even where consumer welfare is not threatened.93
In effect, such firms are required to behave “as if” they were not dominant. Yet, the 
European definition of fairness goes even further by prohibiting dominant firms from 
91
 David Gerber, supra note 58.
92 Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282, para 57 (“[a 
dominant firm] has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair undistorted  
competition on the common market.”)
93 See, e.g., David J. Gerber, supra note 16 (“while the prohibition of cartel agreements had 
analogues in U.S. antitrust law, the concept of prohibiting abuse of a market-dominating position 
was an important new development closely associated with ordoliberal and German competition 
law thought, and very different from U.S. concepts… Moreover, this influence is often evident in 
the development of the law by the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, for 
concepts developed in German competition law frequently find their way into the competition 
law of the Community.”)
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performing acts that non-dominant firms are free to do. The result may be thought of as 
the effective imposition of a penalty upon a firm whose success leads it to dominance.94
A particularly pertinent example of this involves Article 82 (2)(a) EC’s prohibition of 
abusively high pricing.95 American law has no similar provision. But, given the 
importance of the schism possibly at issue, it is important to make explicit a number of 
the major characteristics of EC law that can plausibly be explained by ordoliberal 
thinking and to demonstrate how the introduction of an economic approach would lead to 
superior outcomes. To do so, three unilateral business practices indicative of the 
European incorporation of ordoliberal thinking will be compendiously considered.
1) Predatory Pricing
The process by which a dominant firm forces competitors from a market through 
“unfairly” low pricing encapsulates quite succinctly the various socio-economic 
objections of the Freiburg School, in addition to the political hostility toward large 
corporations whose pricing eliminates small- and medium-sized, often family-owned, 
business. It was argued above that these concerns are no longer appropriate within the 
modern European market. 
94 See, e.g., RICHARD WHISH, supra note 8, at 175 (“A criticism of the Commission has been that 
it prohibits business practices of dominant firms that would be perfectly acceptable if the firm 
were not dominant and yet which are considered to be abusive if they are dominant; this amounts 
to the imposition of a handicap upon those firms, effectively penalizing them because of their 
success.”)
95 See, e.g., Commission Press Release IP/98/707, 27 July 1998 (pertaining to the Commission’s 
investigation of excessive pricing with respect to cell phone calls.)
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The European Court of Justice has viewed low pricing leading to increasing 
concentration with hostility.96 Strong evidence of this exists. First, the fact of harm to 
business is sufficient. A plaintiff need not prove any long-run detriment to consumer 
wealth in the form of likely higher prices in future periods under EC competition law.97
Second, a plaintiff need not prove that the dominant firm’s pricing was so low as to be 
inconsistent with its short-run profit maximization. Rather, evidence of a dominant firm’s 
pricing below average total cost (ATC), though above average variable cost (AVC), 
coupled with intent to eliminate a competitor, will constitute a violation of Article 82 
EC.98 Economics teaches us that a firm should continue to operate at optimum capacity 
and, in cases of low demand, should price anywhere above AVC in the short-run. In other 
words, rational, short-run profit maximizing behavior on the part of a business may be 
deemed “predatory” under EC law. This is inconsistent with the fundamental tenet of the 
offense, namely that a predatory firm must necessarily forego profitability in a particular 
period in order to make greater profits in the future. A firm being free to act in a manner 
consistent with its immediate, first order condition for profit maximization is central to 
the workings of a free economy. Yet, if such low pricing leads to objectionable 
concentration, ordoliberal concerns are nevertheless raised.
96 See Case C-62/86, AKZO v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-3359, [1993] 5 C.M.L.R. 215. 
97 Id. at para 71 (acknowledging the principle of recoupment, but declining to regard it as a 
requirement.)
98 Id. (pricing below ATC, yet above AVC can still be a violation of Article 82 when coupled 
with a desire to eliminate a competitor. The problem arises when conscious pricing within this 
range, even though profit-maximizing, may be made with knowledge that less efficient rivals will 
be forced from the market.) See also Case C-395/96, Compagnie Maritime Belge v. Commission,
2000 E.C.R. I-1365, [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 1076. (Selective price cutting, even if not below cost, 
may be objectionable and illegal under Article 82 EC.)
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Nonetheless, it was stressed above, in rejecting the notion that consumers cannot act in 
their own interests, that a lack of entry into a market by small business charging higher 
prices in the presence of a low pricing corporation strongly implies that consumers are 
benefiting from the latter’s presence. Thus, under no circumstances should such low 
pricing, even below cost pricing, be prohibited where the low-pricing firm does not 
obtain monopoly power as a result. In essence, low pricing in a single period to the 
benefit of consumers, as evidenced by their purchases from the “predatory” firm, is 
unobjectionable if supracompetitive prices cannot be charged later.
Consistent with this reasoning, the U.S. Supreme Court has required proof of a 
“dangerous probability of recoupment” in predatory pricing claims.99 The Chicago 
approach to antitrust counsels lower prices and higher output as the key to higher 
consumer welfare. In this sense, therefore, competition authorities should be slow to 
place any barriers in the path of vigorous price competition. Recognizing that below-cost 
pricing is to the unequivocal short-run benefit of consumers, American courts require 
proof of likely future harm thereto. If no danger of such harm is apparent, for example 
because barriers to entry to the market in question are slight, U.S. law declines to prohibit 
the practice, recognizing instead that the entire episode resulted in heightened consumer 
wealth, harm to incumbent competitors notwithstanding. Moreover, the requirement of 
likely future harm serves to reduce the probability of erroneous judicial determination. 
99 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (concluding 
that no violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act could follow from a firm’s below cost pricing, 
where the oligopolistic nature of the market rendered the probability of recoupment unlikely.)
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This clear divergence in substantive law directly reflects the adherence to differing 
schools of thought – Chicago versus the amalgam of theoretical bases in Europe. The 
policies and conclusions discussed heretofore counsel an amendment in this area of 
European law.
2) Product Tying
Perhaps the most economically complex unilateral business practice relates to a firm’s 
imposition of a tie-in. Product tying can be usefully employed as a framework in which to 
apply the advocated economic approach and to discard the ordoliberal philosophy still
underlying EC competition law. The two approaches – Freiburg and Chicago – are 
diametrically opposed in this context and, in addition, adherence to ordoliberal views 
within the context of product tying is likely to be heavily inimical to consumer welfare.
Coupled with the observation that the major instances of international divergence have 
arisen in the context of tie-ins,100 the need to address the subject becomes compelling.
For the purposes of the following discussion, the extreme assumptions shall be made that:
(1) the tying firm has a complete monopoly over the tying market, (2) prior to the tie, the 
tied market was subject to perfect competition, with price equal to the marginal cost of 
production, and (3) the only consumers of tied products are those who also consume the 
100 Compare U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, Justice Department Requires Divestitures 
General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001), at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8140.htm, with General 
Electric/COMP/M.2220, EC Decision of July 3, 2001, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf.
60
corresponding tying products and derive a higher degree of utility from the latter. Only in 
such rare circumstances will a tying firm be able to acquire monopoly market share of the 
tied market so that genuine ordoliberal issues will be raised. It will therefore be assumed 
that the imposition of a tie confers a monopoly market share on the tying firm in the tied 
market, which was formerly subject to perfect competition.
The tension between the Freiburg and Chicago Schools is particularly acute because 
market share acquired through product tying, though elevating concentration, is highly 
unlikely to confer market power on the tying firm, save where the tying and tied goods 
are complementary.101
A tying firm will necessarily be unable to charge a double monopoly mark-up.102
Assuming that it is already charging a monopoly price in the tying market, should it 
attempt to tie a second good at a supracompetitive price it will effectively elevate its price 
in the tying market to beyond the profit-maximizing level. If such ties cannot reduce 
consumer welfare, why are they imposed? The answer, almost certainly, is due to the 
efficiencies underlying tying arrangements.103
Nevertheless, care should be taken with respect to the double monopoly mark-up 
constraint in the context of complementary goods. If a tying firm has market power in the 
tying market, does it make a difference whether such power is exercised in the tied as 
opposed to tying market?
101
 Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 69 YALE L.J. 19 (1957). 
102 Id.
103 See e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 29 at 319.
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Not if the tying firm engages in bundling. Where a firm engages in fixed proportions 
tying, it will be incapable of diminishing consumer welfare – as goods are bundled, if 
consumers in the tied market are made worse off by a tie, the consumers in the tying 
market necessarily benefit to a commensurate degree and vice versa. Fixed proportions 
bundling cannot, therefore, raise consumer welfare issues absent extraordinary 
circumstances.104
Variable proportions requirements contracts, however, present a more complicated 
situation in which tying may reduce consumer welfare in one market by more that it 
increases such welfare in the other market.105 As the tying market is already monopolized 
and, by assumption, a monopoly price was being charged prior to the introduction of the 
tie, the tying firm will maximize profit by reducing that monopoly price in the tying 
market to avail of the demand-elevating effects created thereby in the tied market. 
Simultaneously, the tying firm will increase the price in the tied market to increase its 
profits. This is because zero economic profits were being enjoyed there due to the fact 
that price equaled marginal cost before the tie.106 As a result, prices in both the tying and 
tied markets will be somewhere between the competitive and monopoly prices; 
consumers will be better off in the tying market and worse off in the tied market. Which 
effect is greater?
104
 These may include instances in which the tying firm is subject to price regulation in the tying 
market or where the tying market is a high-technology market, subject to powerful network 
effects, in which case bundling could conceivably be used to further consumer “lock-in” and to 
thereby disrupt future competition with respect to standard setting.
105 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 
515 (1985).
106
 This is due to the assumption of perfect competition in the tied market prior to the tie.
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The answer necessarily depends on the underlying relation between the market demand 
curves in the tying and tied markets and is therefore somewhat ambiguous. Nevertheless, 
given the underlying assumption that the consumers of the tying product derive greater 
utility therefrom than they do from the tied product, it is more likely than not that a 
reduction in the price of the tying product will increase consumer welfare by more than a 
rise in the price of the tied product will reduce it.
Even where complementary goods are involved, therefore, overall consumer welfare is 
likely to rise, even if market power is exercised over two markets.107
Thus, a court adopting a consumer welfare standard – economically defined – would 
generally approve such tying arrangements for contributing to efficiency and consumer 
wealth. In contrast, a Freiburg court would find a quintessential violation of competition 
law in the circumstances due to the concentration and reduction in consumer choice 
involved. Moreover, a barriers to entry theory would likely be adopted in that potential 
entrants to the tied market would be unable to directly access consumers, having to enter 
both the tying and tied markets together,108 which of course violates a major ordoliberal 
goal. From an economic perspective, however, this issue is moot because allocative 
efficiency only desires entry by a rival equally or more efficient than the incumbent. A 
107 CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 29 at 638.
108 See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press 1956). But compare GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 
(1968) (arguing that a long-run barrier to entry is one that imposes a cost on an entrant that an 
incumbent does not need to bear).
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basic insight, based on Coasian economics,109 is that a more efficient entrant will not be 
barred from the tied market: he will merely contract with the incumbent who will 
outsource production, thereby increasing profits, while the efficiency saving in 
production will be passed onto the consumers in the form of lower prices. Moreover, 
should he wish to sell directly to consumers, he can enter both the tying and tied markets 
simultaneously. As capital markets generally work efficiently, access to the requisite 
capital to enter on such a large scale would only be frustrated were there a high risk of a 
post-entry insolvency-producing equilibrium resulting.110 Given that the incumbent is 
enjoying monopoly profits, post-entry insolvency is highly unlikely111 and, thus, access to 
capital will not constitute a barrier to entry.
Europe has unsurprisingly fallen on the ordoliberal side of the line. Where a dominant 
firm imposes a tie, a violation of Article 82 EC automatically follows.112
109 See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, ECONOMICA (1937), at
http://people.bu.edu/vaguirre/courses/bu332/nature_firm.pdf (arguing that firms will vertically 
integrate only where “the cost of using the price mechanism” – that is, contracting with third 
parties, exceeds the cost of in-house production). 
110 Such a scenario may arise if price-based competition a la Bertrand would be expected post-
entry in the presence of fixed costs. The ensuing marginal cost pricing will lead to insolvency for 
the entrant, but not for the incumbent assuming the latter has recovered its fixed costs through 
supracompetitive pricing pre-entry. If there is a perceived risk of Bertrand competition following 
entry, the cost of capital will be rendered high for the entrant due to risk. Alternatively, the 
incumbent, if it is more efficient, may employ a limit price strategy. The effect will be the same.
111
 It should be noted that the Nash equilibrium is for the incumbent to accommodate entry and 
share the market. This renders the chance of an insolvency-producing equilibrium with price at or 
below the entrant’s marginal cost highly unlikely.
112 See, e.g., Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Commission 1990 E.C.R. II-163, 4 C.M.L.R. 16 (1992), 
upheld on appeal Case 53/92 P Hilti AG v. Commission 1994 E.C.R. I-667, 4 C.M.L.R. 614 
(1994); 1992 O.J. (L 72) 1, 4 C.M.L.R. 551 (1992), upheld on appeal to the CFI Case T-83/91,
Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission (1994) E.C.R. II-755, (1997) 4 C.M.L.R. 726 and on 
appeal to the ECJ case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission 1996 E.C.R. I-
5951, 4 C.M.L.R. 662 (1997); 1988 O.J. (L 284) 41, 4 C.M.L.R. 196 (1990).
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Intriguingly, however, the United States does not represent a shining beacon of perfection 
with regard to the employment of economically-informed antitrust principles within the 
field of tying practices.  It is amusing to note that some of the most scathing and derisive 
criticism emanating from America toward Europe has been made in the context of tying 
law – a field where the U.S. has quite similarly failed to employ price theory correctly 
and which has thereby created a situation open to the identical criticism that it serves to 
protect competitors from more efficient rivals. Indeed, historically at the time of the 
Warren Court, the United States would have been more prone to that same criticism than 
Europe has ever been.113
Nevertheless, there is evidence of U.S. law’s potential move away from the standard of 
per se illegality. First, the Supreme Court has come close, 4-5, to reversing that 
standard.114 While the Court has not taken the opportunity to make this dissenting opinion 
binding law in subsequent cases,115 it at least demonstrates that the leverage and 
foreclosure theories of tying do not enjoy ubiquitous support within the highest levels of 
American jurisprudence.116 It suggests too that as the economic approach to antitrust 
becomes further engrained, the Court may indeed abandon its traditional position.
113
 At this time, the Supreme Court went so far as to dispense with the requirement of significant 
market power with respect to the tying firm. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 365 
U.S. 1. As will be discussed in Chapters Three and Four, an accurate finding of market power is 
an absolute sine qua non for even a possibility of anticompetitive effect ensuing. U.S. law now 
correctly requires a showing of “substantial market power.” See, e.g., Hardy v. City Optical Inc., 
39 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1994).
114 Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 1 (1984).
115 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S.Ct 2072 (1992).
116
 It should be noted that it is impossible to make such an observation with respect to the 
European Court of Justice, as it does not issue dissenting opinions.
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Second, a modern move in American law away from per se illegality exists with respect 
to physical integration. Where two goods are physically integrated, which, as an 
economic matter, is analogous to a bundle, the law is dramatically different. Here, 
legality is effectively presumed and only where a showing that the integration serves no 
consumer purpose will illegality follow.117
Third, a clear move away from the traditional position has arisen with regard to the new 
economy. The Microsoft case saw the D.C. Circuit enunciate a rule of reason approach to 
product tying in the context of high-technology, software markets.118
Finally, when one considers that U.S. law has adopted an economic approach to most 
other areas of antitrust law and that such an approach is therefore likely to eventually 
permeate through to tying arrangements, it seems reasonable to observe that a gulf exists, 
and is likely to grow considerably larger, between the U.S. and EC treatment of tie-ins.
As a result, the economic approach advocated heretofore would serve to bring U.S. law to 
the destination to which it is already gravitating, whilst simultaneously achieving 
international harmonization within this area of law.\
3) Refusal to Supply
117 Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976) (the 
antitrust laws are violated only where the integration “has been for the purpose of tying the 
products, rather than to achieve some technologically beneficial result.")
118 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F. 3d 935, 949-50 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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The need to jettison ordoliberal principles from European law can be well illustrated by 
an examination of the EC’s treatment of mandatory access. Unsurprisingly, the entire 
concept of refusal to supply can be seen to mirror the Freiburg School, which seeks to 
prohibit any actions, concerted or otherwise, that may create obstacles to a rival firm or 
consumer accessing a market. It is well settled under EC law that a dominant firm cannot 
unilaterally decide to cease supplies to downstream companies where the dominant 
undertaking.119 Indeed, the concept of mandatory access has been taken so far under 
European law that it has even been applied in a compulsory dealing context – very much 
akin to copyright law.120
The danger inherent in compelling open access remedies a la Freiburg can be made most 
clear through an illustrative model. A pertinent and topical example can be employed in 
relation to the recent action against Microsoft for product tying. 
Adopting the goals of free access to markets and preservation of consumer choice, the 
Commission implemented a remedy requiring Microsoft to disclose the interfaces 
necessary to enable rivals to achieve interoperability with the Windows operating 
system.121 The quasi-open source remedy sought by the Commission is controversial. 
One may initially take the view that by compelling the emergence of interoperability, the 
Commission will unequivocally increase the level of competition within the market. But 
this view is necessarily correct only if one views the market in a static context. By 
119
 Cases 6/73 & 7/73, Commercial Solvents v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 
309.
120 See, e.g., 1991 E.C.R. II-485, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586, upheld by the ECJ Cases 241/91, RTE 
& ITP v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-743, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718.
121 Id.
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attempting to improve ex post access to the relevant market, the Commission may, 
ironically, cause substantial long-term harm.
This point can be made explicit through game theory. The assumptions made for the 
purposes of the model are, by design, extreme, so as to make evident the potential harm 
ensuing from the Commission’s remedy.
The validity of former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti’s belief that the remedy 
imposed “restores the conditions for fair competition in the markets concerned”122
depends critically on the fundamental, and readily questionable, assumption that, by the 
time of effective monopolization of Windows operating software, Microsoft will have 
been adequately compensated through its pre-judgment enforcement of proprietary rights 
and post-“dilution” income.123 The critical issue pertains to proper incentive creation. Ex 
post evidence of sufficient compensation makes a good case for allowing free access, 
except of course for the consequent effect on further potential innovation. More clear is 
the likely effect on would-be developers of platform standards, in the form of on ex ante 
incentives, under a regime where success guarantees disenfranchisement of proprietary 
rights. An application of basic game theory may help to make this clear.
In a one-shot game, where, for the sake of simplicity, two rivals, Alpha and Beta, are in 
the process of developing competing standards, the dominant strategy will be for both 
122 Id.
123
 The term “dilution” is not used as a state of art as it appears within the law of copyright. 
Instead, it refers here to the reduced income likely to flow to a monopolist following the 
imposition of an open source/free access remedy.
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competitors to seek to monopolize the market to maximize their single-period pay-off 
where the expected value of intense innovation (H/2) is greater than the profit from 
engaging in only a minimal level of innovation (M). The Nash equilibrium will be at the 
socially optimal level with each company dedicating a high level of capital. It is assumed 
that the market is one characterized by “tipping phenomenon” after a sufficiently high 
level of innovation:
Beta
KB = low KB = high
Alpha KA = low M, M 0, H
KA = high H, 0 H/2, H/2. 
Where K = capital invested; H = high level of profit; M = a moderate level of profit 
consistent with a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in a duopoly; and H/2= 50/50 chance 
between a high level of profit and zero profit (exit).
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In a multi-period world without a determined end, however, the resulting incentives may 
be rendered perverse by implementation of the Commission’s remedy. Both competitors 
know ex ante that their rewards will drop to zero if either’s platform becomes the 
universal standard for the market in question.124 This fact markedly reduces their 
incentive to engage in the kind of intense innovation that is likely to lead to 
monopolization. Instead, both parties know that their best strategy may be to produce 
platforms of a more homogeneous quality with neither seeking to innovate with the level 
of enthusiasm, or, indeed, through the dedication of sufficient capital, to produce 
platforms of the quality available in a “first-best” world.
Given the single-period payoff matrix, Alpha and Beta will engage in intense innovation 
(KA = KB = high) only if:
N (K=high) >     N (K=low)   +  N+1 + N+2 + N+3 + N+4 +… + N
(1+i)1 (1+i)2 (1+i)3 (1+i)4         (1+i)N
Assuming constant discount rate and profit levels, the socially desirable level of 
innovation will materialize only if:
124
 This, of course, is an unrealistic assumption, for the winner will continue to reap financial 
reward from its innovation. Nevertheless, any kind of compulsory access reduces the expected 
return from innovation and, hence, blunts the incentive to engage in research and development ex 
ante. The potential consequences of an open access remedy can be made most clear, however, 
through the adoption of extreme assumptions.
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H  >      M
2 i
Waldman & Jensen estimate most firms’ real-life discount rates as typically being 
between 0.05 and 0.1.125 Taking it as 0.05, then the socially outcome will arise only if:
H    >    40 M
That is, only if the single-period profit from successfully monopolizing the market is at 
least forty times higher than the single-period profit from engaging in little innovation 
will the desirable level of investment occur. This may or may not be the case, but there is 
certainly no reason to assume that the level of profits earned will be sufficient as to have 
spurred the innovation. 
Clearly this fear could be allayed somewhat by arguing that in marginal cases 
competition policy should still err on the proprietary side of the line, but it surely remains 
the case that it is the duty of any responsible antitrust policy to further investigate the 
likely effect on incentive-creation by the proposed approach.
Of course, the European Commission would no doubt argue that only where the desired 
level of investment has in fact occurred should an open access regime in the form of 
compulsory interoperability be implemented. But the point of the above exercise is to 
125 WALDMAN & JENSEN, supra note 31.
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show that, by implementing such a policy once, regulators cannot credibly commit to not 
doing so again, with the resulting effects on incentives outlined above.
Insofar as the Commission decision stands for the precedent that winners within new 
economy industries will have their reward curtailed through the imposition of 
interoperability remedies, it creates a significant danger of in fact reducing the level of 
the important form of competition in “winner takes all” markets. As was argued above, 
the truly meaningful and desirable form of competition with respect to the new economy 
may well take place in research and development to establish standards. Post-success 
monopoly profits, while in static context a clear source of disutility to consumers, is a 
necessary condition for pre-establishment competition to take place. There is reason to 
believe the post-success monopoly pricing will be ephemeral if a socially-desirable form 
of research and development by the incumbent monopolist does not take place, for it will 
quickly be displaced.126 The prohibition of practices likely to prevent that displacement 
on grounds other than efficiency should be pursued especially vigorously in this context, 
but it was readily shown that the product tying taking place with respect to Microsoft 
probably did not have such an objectionable effect.
It may be concluded that the Microsoft litigation provides both a source of hope with 
respect to U.S. development in product tying law, with a more flexible rule of reason 
126 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER supra note 2, at 249-250 (“The gale of creative destruction that 
Schumpeter described, in which a sequence of temporary monopolies operates to maximize 
innovation that confers social benefits far in excess of the social costs of the short-lived 
monopoly prices that the process also gives rise to, may be the reality of the new economy. This 
is especially likely because quality competition tends to dominate price competition in the 
software industry.”)
72
approach being adopted, and a reason for despair with regard to Europe. It is clear that 
ordoliberal policies remain as firmly engrained as ever. Litigation in the context of the 
new economy could have provided the perfect setting for a review of the European 
approach and it is most disappointing that it did not take place.
• Conclusion
Europe is now faced with difficult choices with respect to the future direction of its 
evolving competition regime. While the Chicago School and post-Chicago literature have 
fused in the United States to ensure a central role for microeconomics, game theory and 
empiricism, no similar foundational principle is readily observable underlying EC 
competition law. The dangers associated with this are numerous. First is the danger to 
legal certainty within Europe itself. The current body of European antitrust law reflects a 
number of philosophical approaches to competition policy which are not readily 
reconcilable and which, in many circumstances, are inherently contradictory. EC 
competition law thus finds itself in an uneasy resting place, precariously balancing the 
often diametrically opposed socio-economic philosophies of consumer wealth, market 
integration, equity and ordoliberalism. A schism between practice and theory creates an 
imbalance and this imbalance, if not addressed, may eventually become perilous. 
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Second, and most importantly, achieving effective antitrust harmonization has never been 
so vital as it is in the context of the increasing globalization of markets. Great steps have 
been, and continue to be, made in this regard, which should be applauded. Nevertheless, 
pure harmonization will forever remain elusive so long as fundamental and unequivocal 
standards by which to inform competition policy fail to emerge on both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
The analysis advocated by this paper finds attractive and relatively straight forward 
resolution when employed through the lens of modern economics with the goal of 
maximizing consumer welfare. The employment of price theory as a means by which to 
maximize consumer wealth carries a concomitant plethora of beneficial effects, including 
the increasing international competitiveness of European industry, the lowering of 
inflation and facilitates a most fundamental form of democratic expression: enabling the 
public at large to decide the ultimate success or failure of businesses catering thereto. 
There is a strong argument that the grounds calling for the paternal state no longer exist, 
or exist to such a truncated degree as to no longer be worthy of antitrust concern.
It is understandable that the unwavering, pro-consumer principles advocated heretofore 
may sit uncomfortably with some observers. Even putting aside the counter-intuitive 
nature of some aspects of industrial organization, it may be difficult for some to accept 
the premise that an unchallenged rise in concentration on the basis of efficiency within 
European markets will be to the ultimate benefit of all involved, given the European 
history of such market structures. Yet, it is submitted that forceful, critical and directed 
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insight into the economics of the situation will reveal, not a draconian and right-wing 
amalgamation of legal principles but, a well reasoned, perspicacious and ultimately 
welfare-enhancing legal framework to launch the European Union into the 21st century as 
one of the world’s greatest, and most competitive, economic powers.
Competition policy setters in Europe are now faced with, what may be fairly 
characterized as, an exigency in deciding whether to increase the level of critical, 
economic insight into the doctrines pervading the law. It is indeed true that the “European 
Union is at a crossroads as to whether it will move to the dominant U.S. paradigm.”127
The sooner Europe moves toward adopting economics as the sole guide to dictating 
antitrust policy, the better off the consumers and the economies of the Member States of 
the European Union will be. Unqualified antitrust harmonization with respect to the 
United States awaits such an evolution. While the obstacles to achieving this goal are 
immense, it is the optimistic belief of the author that such change is possible. To quote 
the recent, encouraging aspirations of the current European Competition Commissioner: 
“I think that competition policy evolves as our understanding of economics evolves. In 
days gone by, “fairness” played a prominent role in [U.S.] enforcement in a way that is 
no longer the case. I don’t see why a similar development could not take place in 
Europe.”128
127 Eleanor M. Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive 
Effect, at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/228.pdf.
128 Neelie Kroes, supra note 24.
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Statement of Originality: 
The foregoing piece has been inspired through research for my Ph.D degree, which is in 
its terminal stages. I have read widely on the topic in question and can confidently state 
that the above Note is original. While much academic comment exists on the nature and 
evolution of U.S. antitrust law, American treatment of both European competition policy 
and the source of transatlantic divergence is rather sparse. This is especially true with 
respect to the Freiburg School of ordoliberalism. David Gerber, cited above in the Note, 
is one of very few authors to have explored the background of that school in detail. 
Nevertheless, no substantive critique of the role of Freiburg within Europe has been 
furthered within the U.S. literature, either in isolation or in the transatlantic context 
portrayed above. 
